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 Executive Summary 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Climate change and energy security have come to dominate the energy policy 
agenda. Concerns about energy security in the UK have been driven by the loss of 
self-sufficiency in oil and natural gas and a growing dependency on imports. 
 
2. This report explores ways of enhancing the “resilience” of the UK energy system to 
withstand external shocks and examines how such measures interact with those 
designed to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The concept of resilience is 
explored and a set of “indicators” is developed to define quantitatively the 
characteristics of a resilient energy system. In the report we systematically test the 
response of the UK energy system under different scenarios to hypothetical shocks. 
These are all assumed to involve the loss of gas infrastructure. We then assess 
mitigating measures which can help to reduce the impact of these shocks and test 
their cost effectiveness using an insurance analogy. 
 
3. The report covers one workstream in the larger UK Energy 2050 project conducted 
by UKERC. The wider project is described comprehensively in a Synthesis Report 
(Skea et al., 2009) and in a book exploring the project and a wider range of policy 
issues (Skea et al., 2011). In particular, the scenarios describing broad energy 
system change which frame the analysis in this report are covered only briefly. 
Readers interested in underlying assumptions about energy demand and supply are 
referred to these other publications.  
 
4. We have used three energy models to conduct this analysis. The first is the MARKAL-
MED model, a linear optimisation model which covers the entire UK energy system 
and can address interactions between different parts of the energy system.  
 
5. The second is the WASP electricity generation planning model originally developed by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is used to explore, in more detail, 
the levels of generation investment needed to maintain reliable supplies. It is a cost 
minimising model. The WASP model is fed electricity demand assumptions from 
MARKAL-MED.  
 
6. The third model is the geographically explicit Combined Gas and Electricity Networks 
(CGEN) model which is used to assess where electricity generation capacity should be 
located and how much gas and electricity infrastructure (wires, pipes, gas storage, 
import terminals) should be constructed. It is another cost-minimising model which is 
fed results from both MARKAL-MED and WASP. 
 
The analytical approach 
 
7. It is has been argued that policies and measures that help to reduce CO2 emissions 
will help to promote energy security and vice versa. This is clearly the case for 
energy efficiency which reduces both CO2 emissions and our dependence on energy. 
But fossil fuels will play an important role in our energy mix for some time to come. 
 Energy sources such as coal may contribute to diversity of supply and thereby 
enhance security, but deploying them works against our climate change goals. 
Increasingly ambitious plans to deploy intermittent renewable energy pose 
challenges for the reliability of electricity supplies without corresponding investment 
in “back-up” capacity. 
 
8. This work is based on four “core” scenarios, organised on a 2x2 matrix, for the 
development of the UK energy system out to 2050. One dimension of the matrix 
refers to the level of ambition for CO2 reduction, the other to the “resilience” of the 
energy system to external shocks. 
 
9. A Reference scenario which assumes no policy measures other than those contained 
in the 2007 Energy White Paper is the starting point. Under the Low Carbon scenario, 
CO2 emissions are constrained so that they fall 36% below 1990 levels by 2025 and 
80% by 2050. Our Resilient scenario embodies a number of constraints that enhance 
the ability of the energy system to withstand shocks, but has no CO2 constraints. A 
Low Carbon Resilient scenario includes both sets of constraints. 
 
Characterising Resilience 
 
10. The advantage of focusing on resilience as the key concept is that it can be seen as 
an intrinsic characteristic of the energy system. It does not require us to think about 
the underlying causes of a particular shock, for example a prolonged interruption of 
gas supply.  
 
11. Drawing heavily on the ecological sciences, we used the following working definition 
of energy system resilience: 
 
“Resilience is the capacity of an energy system to tolerate disturbance and to 
continue to deliver affordable energy services to consumers. A resilient energy 
system can speedily recover from shocks and can provide alternative means of 
satisfying energy service needs in the event of changed external circumstances.”  
 
12. To ensure that boundaries were clearly defined, we also adopted the following 
working definition of the UK energy system: 
 
“the set of technologies, physical infrastructure, institutions, policies and practices 
located in and associated with the UK which enable energy services to be delivered to 
UK consumers”. 
 
13. The UK Government has identified three elements of energy security: 
 
• physical security: avoiding involuntary physical interruptions to consumption of 
energy (i.e., the lights going out or gas supplies being cut off); 
 
• price security: avoiding unnecessary price spikes due to supply/demand 
imbalances or poor market operation (e.g., market power); 
 
 • geopolitical security: avoiding undue reliance on specific nations so as to maintain 
maximum degrees of freedom in foreign policy. 
 
14. To address these, we identify three key elements of a resilient energy system: lower 
levels of imports and hence energy demand; diversity of supply; and robust physical 
infrastructure.  A resilient energy system needs to deliver energy services reliably in 
the light of outcomes to which probabilities can be attached (plant outages, weather 
variability) but must also be resilient to larger scale “shocks” to which it is difficult to 
attach probabilities. Less work has been carried out on this latter aspect. 
 
Macro-indicators of resilience 
 
15. The following quantified indicators of resilience were arrived at by assessing their 
practical feasibility and by conducting a variety of sensitivity analyses using the 
MARKAL-Med model. These are applied as constraints in the Resilient and Low 
Carbon Resilient scenarios. 
 
16. Energy demand and imports. We have set a constraint that final energy demand 
should fall by about 3.2% per annum relative to GDP, or about 1% per annum in 
absolute terms, from 2010 onwards. These were benchmarked against bottom-up 
estimates of the potential impact of energy efficiency measures out to 2020 made by 
Government in the most recent carbon and energy projections available at the time 
the analysis was conducted. Our assumptions about constrained final energy demand 
correspond roughly to the assumption of high impact of energy efficiency measures 
up to 2020. We then assume that the same pace of improvement will continue 
thereafter. This constraint is therefore at the upper end of the plausible range in 
terms of energy demand reduction. 
 
17. Primary energy demand. We have constrained primary energy demand so that no 
single energy source (e.g. natural gas, nuclear) gains more than a 40% market 
share. The constraint on maximum share for primary energy supply ensured supply 
diversity in the economy as a whole. 
 
18. Electricity generation. We have constrained the electricity generation mix so that 
no single energy source gains more than a 40% market share. Generation mix was 
constrained because the electricity sector was found to play a key role in shifting the 
primary energy mix. 
 
19. With these constraints applied in the resilient scenarios, the energy system develops 
rather differently from the Low Carbon case. The Low Carbon scenario is dominated 
by rapid de-carbonisation on the supply side, especially in the electricity sector. The 
sector is virtually de-carbonised by 2030 and electricity enters new markets through 
electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles and heat pumps in the residential sector. In the 
Resilient scenario, electricity de-carbonisation takes place more slowly. In the Low 
Carbon Resilient scenario, the electricity system de-carbonises by 2050 but the pace 
of de-carbonisation is about 10-15 years behind the Low Carbon scenario. 
 
 20. The main theme in the resilient scenarios is the driving down of energy demand. This 
happens in respect of demand for gas in the residential, services and industrial 
sectors. This translates directly into reduced imports. 
 
21. The key conclusion is that the low carbon agenda contributes to meeting some 
resilience objectives, especially those relating to diversity but it still leaves the UK 
much more import dependent. The Resilient scenario reduces CO2 emissions by 52% 
by 2050, well short of the UK’s target. 
 
Physical Infrastructure  
 
22. The MARKAL-MED model determines how much electricity generating capacity it 
installs by applying a capacity margin on top of exogenously specified peak demand.1 
However, as more intermittent renewable capacity (e.g. wind) is added to the 
system, this simple approach may not meet recognised security standards. The 
WASP and CGEN models were run to ensure that sufficient investment is made. 
 
23. The models use a number of key parameters combined with statistical analysis to 
ensure adequate investment in electricity capacity. These include: value of lost load 
(£5/MWh for residential electricity; £40/kWh for industrial electricity; £5/therm for 
industrial gas; and loss-of load expectation for electricity (maximum 4 hours per year 
or 0.05% of the time). Disconnection of residential gas is not permitted. 
 
24. Applying these reliability standards adds to electricity system costs. The maximum 
annual increase across the scenarios is £354m in 2020 (Low Carbon Resilient 
scenario), £575m in 2035 (Low Carbon scenario) and £457m in 2050 (Resilient 
scenario). 
 
25. To meet gas reliability standards, the CGEN model adds LNG terminals and gas 
storage capacity in addition to facilities that are currently planned. In the Reference 
scenario, 160 mcm/d of LNG terminals and 2,000 mcm of storage capacity are added 
by 2030.   In the Low Carbon scenario, the same investment in LNG terminals is 
made, but the need for additional storage capacity is reduced to 1,000 mcm. The 
Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios require less capacity because gas 
demand is lower and the demand profile is less “peaky”. In these two scenarios,140 
mcm/d of LNG terminals are added by 2030 but no additional gas storage.   
 
System shocks 
 
26. We have hypothesised a set of shocks to the gas system and investigated the 
impacts. We do not attribute any specific cause to these shocks, but they are 
compatible with previous events caused by major accidents rather than politically 
motivated supply interruptions. There is a system response which adds to costs, but 
with the most severe shocks supply curtailments are inevitable. The model predicts 
the following sequence of responses: a) invoking interruptible gas contracts with 
industry; b) re-dispatching the power system to use less gas; c) use of back-up 
distillate oil in CCGTs; and d) involuntary interruptions to industrial customers. 
                                                 
1 However, intermittent renewable capacity is down-rated using a “capacity credit” to ensure investment in 
“back-up” plant. 
  
27. The “shocks” were all assumed to take place in mid-winter (1 January in 2025) 
during a spell of “average cold spell” demand. We tested the consequences of losing 
the Bacton or Easington gas terminals or the Milford Haven LNG terminal for periods 
of 5, 40 or 90 days. This is broadly consistent with past “shocks” in the gas sector. 
 
28. The costs associated with the shocks were much lower in the Resilient and Low 
Carbon Resilient scenarios. This is because gas demand is much lower. The loss of 
Easington or Milford Haven does not entail any costs at all in the 5 and 40 days 
cases. 
 
29. The loss of the largest terminal, Bacton, which affects both imported and domestic 
gas supplies, has the largest impact in the other scenarios.  
 
30. The energy system can ‘ride through’ the loss of Easington or Milford Haven under 
the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios – and the impact of losing Bacton is 
much diminished. This is because these two scenarios are characterised by lower 
levels of seasonal gas demand. The system can cope better when demand is less 
‘peaky’. Demand reduction demonstrably contributes to energy system resilience 
 
31. The imputed value of unserved energy (in £bns) is an order of magnitude larger than 
the changed system costs. System costs generally rise as more expensive gas is 
sourced and coal substitutes for gas in electricity generation. This however does not 
take account of the response in energy spot markets that would be expected 
following such events, which would tend to increase costs to consumers further. 
 
32. The patterns of response are complex because the facilities play different roles in the 
gas network. In none of the scenarios is it necessary to curtail electricity supplies. 
Response is taken up entirely by exercising interruptible gas contracts, re-dispatch of 
the electricity system, use of distillate oil at certain CCGTs and non-contracted 
industrial gas interruptions.  
 
Mitigating the shocks 
 
33. We tested the effectiveness of a set of infrastructure investments, over and above 
those required to meet normal reliability standards, in mitigating the hypothesised 
shocks. These included: gas storage; LNG terminals; new gas interconnectors; and 
storage of distillate oil back-up at CCGT plant. 
 
34. We focus on the loss of Bacton, the most severe shock, for a 40-day period and 
assess the impact of these mitigating investments in the Low Carbon scenario. The 
biggest impact in terms of reducing the volume of energy unserved comes from the 
expansion of import facilities, be they new LNG terminals or a new interconnector. 
Dedicated gas storage and 40 days distillate storage have half to two thirds the 
impact of more import facilities.  
 
35. The effectiveness of gas storage is critically dependent on how much gas is in store 
at the time of the shock. If a storage facility is used as strategic storage and kept 
completely full for emergencies it will be much more effective in mitigating shocks.  
  
36. Making a mitigating investment can be regarded as taking out insurance against the 
eventuality of adverse events. If a rate of return of 10% real is required on 
investment in two LNG terminals, then the 40-day Bacton outage would need to take 
place more than once every 35 years to pay off. Given the severity of the event, and 
the improbability of its happening as frequently as this, it is almost impossible to 
conceive of this as a good investment in a market context.  
 
37. On the other hand, the mitigating measures could be regarded as strategic 
investments taken in the public interest. At a rate of return on investment of only 
3.5% real, the Treasury “social” discount rate, investing in LNG terminals might still 
‘pay off’ if the event were to occur as infrequently as once in 100 years.  
 
The Costs of Resilience 
 
38. There are costs and benefits associated with moving from the Low Carbon to the Low 
Carbon Resilient scenario. Most of these are associated with the macro-indicators of 
resilience, especially bearing down on final energy demand. Energy system costs are 
£5bn lower in 2025 simply because the energy system is smaller. However, there is 
an implied loss of welfare of £15bn associated with the loss of consumer surplus as 
consumers respond to higher energy prices.  
 
39. In practice, it may be possible to mitigate some or even all of these welfare losses.  
If 25% of the demand reduction is achieved through low cost conservation measures 
the welfare loss is reduced by £2.3bn. We also explored a scenario where people 
voluntarily reduce their energy use as a result of social and cultural change. This may 
involve no welfare loss at all – and it reduces the energy system cost by £35bn in 
2025. 
 
40. The costs of ensuring electricity system reliability and reinforcing gas infrastructure 
are orders of magnitude less than the costs associated with driving the macro-
structure of the energy system in different directions. Enhanced electricity reliability 
appears to cost around £10-15 per household per year while additional investment in 
gas storage or import facilities appears to run at around £2 per household.  
 
Policies for resilience 
 
41. Achieving the macro goals of reduced imports and greater supply diversity can be 
achieved through the vigorous pursuit of fairly conventional policy instruments. The 
key is a very strong emphasis on policies to improve energy efficiency in buildings 
and transport. The emphasis on the demand side needs to be much stronger than in 
a pure Low Carbon scenario. Keeping up the pace of investment in renewables and 
nuclear will also contribute.   
 
42. As regards reliability and redundancy in the electricity system, current UK 
Government policy is to deliver an adequate capacity margin by having a licensing 
obligation on power companies to meet energy demands, and then relying on 
markets, through price signals, to deliver capacity that may only be rarely used.  
There is now a widespread view that current market arrangements may not be 
 sufficient to guarantee reliable energy supply while ambitious low carbon targets and 
renewable energy goals are pursued. Consultation on the Government’s proposals for 
Electricity Market Reform concluded in March 2011. 
 
43. This report suggests that there is potentially a case for investment in further 
”strategic” gas infrastructure beyond that which the market would deliver if we 
pursue the supply-led energy strategy embodied in the Low Carbon scenario. By 
itself, that investment would be relatively modest and would add little to consumer 
costs.  
 
44. There are three possible models for stimulating such investment: Government 
provides the appropriate framework for the market to make the investment; the 
regulator permits the investment through price reviews, but the investment is 
provided by the regulated companies; Government carries out the investment itself. 
The latter model appears unlikely. The key policy question is whether the benefits of 
driving this investment through rate of return regulation outweigh the disadvantages 
of driving out investment made on a purely market basis. 
 
Future Research Directions 
 
45. In taking work on energy system resilience forwards, we consider the following lines 
of inquiry: 
 
• Examining a wider range of contingencies relating to oil, electricity and 
renewables (including bio-energy) 
 
• Examining market responses to shocks as well as possible physical responses 
costed in a bottom-up manner 
 
• Attempting to attach probabilities to various types of shock. This may not be 
possible for “geopolitical” events, but many of the historic shocks that we 
reviewed resulted for insurable weather or accident-related incidents for which 
evidence may be available. 
 
• Producing new or “reduced” models of system responses to energy shocks that 
could be operated in Monte-Carlo mode. The current models are too cumbersome 
to operate in this way. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
UK energy policy has four objectives: to put the UK on a path to cutting greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions by some 80% by 2050, with real progress by 2020; to maintain the 
reliability of energy supplies; to promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond; and 
to ensure that every home is adequately and affordably heated. Climate change, 
affordability and the reliability of energy supplies have come to dominate the energy 
policy agenda. Chapter One of the 2007 Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007a) bore the title 
Energy and climate security; speeches by the previous Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change have emphasised these goals particularly in light of new evidence about 
the seriousness of climate change and the UK’s increasing dependence on energy, 
especially gas, imports (Miliband, 2008). In October 2008, the ambition of the UK’s 2050 
GHG reduction target was raised from 60% to 80%. The Low Carbon Transition Plan 
(DECC, 2009a) sets out an ambitious policy agenda for starting to realise this ambition. 
In August 2009, a report by the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on International 
Energy argued for a more strategic approach to energy security issues (Wicks, 2009). 
 
It has become a commonplace notion, prevalent in both policy-making and academic 
circles (Grubb et al., 2006), that technologies and measures that reduce CO2 emissions 
contribute to energy security and vice versa. This is clearly the case for energy efficiency 
which reduces both CO2 emissions and our dependence on energy. But fossil fuels will 
play an important role in our energy mix for some time to come. Energy sources such as 
coal may contribute to diversity of supply and thereby enhance security, but deploying 
them works against our climate change goals. Increasingly ambitious plans to deploy 
intermittent renewable energy pose challenges for the reliability of electricity supplies 
without corresponding investment in “back-up” capacity. 
 
The work described in this report forms part of the UKERC Energy 2050 project whose 
overall concern is the development of a resilient low-carbon energy system. This report 
focuses on energy security and resilience, but does so within the wider context of an 
energy policy which is also concerned with radical CO2 emissions reductions. In assessing 
energy security and resilience we concentrate on the electricity and, more particularly, 
the gas systems. This reflects the rapidly changing balance in the UK’s supply-demand 
balance for natural gas and the interconnectedness of the gas and electricity systems. 
1.2 The analytical approach 
 
Progress in reducing the energy sector’s impact on the climate can be measured through 
a single metric, tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent emitted. The energy security 
agenda responds to anxieties and insecurities about a range of contingencies which are 
often not well thought through or are ill-defined. These include adequacy of investment 
in electricity generation capacity, loss of critical infrastructure whether through deliberate 
action or by accident, or politically motivated interruptions to supply in global markets. 
 
The objective in this report is to think through this agenda in a more systematic manner 
and, specifically, to assess the pay-off from measures which could serve to mitigate 
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against some of the contingencies which we face. This has been achieved by considering 
two broad sets of scenarios as to how the UK energy system might develop over the 
coming decades.  
 
We are particularly concerned to take into account “low probability, high impact” events 
to which it is extremely difficult to attach probabilities. Some types of contingency, which 
can be characterised in formal probabilistic terms, can be considered in a full cost-benefit 
framework. This applies particularly to the reliability of electricity and gas systems where 
the probability of failing to meet demand depends on the underlying probability 
distributions associated with weather-related demand variations and the availability of 
generating plant. Using concepts like the “value of lost load” or “expected energy 
unserved” a formal cost–benefit approach is possible. DECC’s Energy Markets Outlook 
(DECC, 2008a) relies heavily on this approach and this is indeed built into our 
framework. However, this report starts to open up methods for considering the larger 
scale contingencies alluded to in policy documents (for example, Wicks, 2009). 
 
The analysis is based on a set of four scenarios depicting the development of the UK 
energy system over the next 40 years. In the first set of two scenarios, we assume that 
the energy system will develop in a “business-as-usual” manner reflecting the approach 
adopted over the last twenty years during a period of self-sufficiency and increasing 
market liberalisation. We consider developments both with and without carbon 
constraints. In the second set of scenarios, we consider patterns of development that 
would make the UK energy system more resilient to various risks and shocks, again with 
and without carbon constraints. 
 
Linking the two principal themes of carbon constraints and energy system resilience we 
arrive at the set of four “core” scenarios that frame the UKERC Energy 2050 project, as 
shown in Figure 1. The wider project and the construct of the core scenarios is described 
comprehensively in a Synthesis Report (Skea et al., 2009) and in a book exploring the 
project and a wider range of policy issues (Skea et al., 2011). A Reference scenario 
assumes no policies other than those in place at the time of the 2007 Energy White 
Paper. A Low Carbon scenario assumes that the UK is on a pathway to an 80% reduction 
in CO2 by 2050. The Resilient scenario ignores CO2, but incorporates a set of measures 
mitigating against different types of energy shock. The final Low Carbon Resilient 
scenario combines the two attributes.  
 
UKERC does not pretend to have expertise in the geo-political aspects of the global 
energy system. The advantage of focusing on resilience as the key concept is that it can 
be seen as an intrinsic characteristic of the energy system itself. It does not require us to 
think about the underlying causes of a particular shock, for example a prolonged 
interruption of gas supply. We only need to know that a particular kind of shock is 
possible. Building in resilience can be achieved only by bringing together a number of 
different mitigating measures. Broadly, these involve bearing down on energy demand, 
ensuring adequate capacity, diversifying supply and making greater investments in 
infrastructure. The value of different mitigation measures obviously depends on the 
nature of the contingencies for which we are preparing. 
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Figure 1: The UKERC Core Scenarios  
  
 
 
We have analysed records of disturbances or shocks to electricity and gas systems, most 
of which can be attributed to weather, accidents and catastrophic equipment failures 
rather than politically motivated supply interruptions. Based on this analysis, we have 
defined a small number of hypothetical shocks to the UK gas system which would then 
ripple through to the electricity supply sector. The shocks are within the range of 
historical experience and are assumed to occur in the year 2025. This year was selected 
so as to be beyond immediate energy policy concerns for the 2010-2020 period, but to 
be well within the lifetime of current investments. The impacts of the shocks against the 
background of each of our core scenarios are tested. This serves to test the impact of 
macro-developments in the energy sector on system resilience and vulnerability. Under 
each of the scenarios we than test the degree to which a number of “mitigating 
measures”, mainly infrastructure investments, can reduce the impact of the hypothetical 
system shocks. This serves to test the possible security and resilience benefits of more 
specific policies.  
1.3 Structure of the report 
 
The first main section of the report, the resilience of an energy system, first explores the 
concept of resilience, drawing on the use of the concept in other fields, and proposes a 
working definition as applied to an energy system. We note that “reliability” in the 
context of statistical variations in energy system variables (demand, weather, equipment 
availability) can be distinguished from “resilience” to high impact and low probability 
events. The section then moves on to identify a candidate set of resilience indicators for 
the energy system. Finally, a small set of indicators is selected and quantified to help 
define the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient core scenarios. 
 
The following section describes in brief the modelling tools used to conduct the analysis. 
The models cover the energy system as whole (MARKEL-MED), investment in electricity 
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generation capacity (WASP), and the development and operation of the gas and 
electricity networks (CGEN).  
 
The following section, energy systems resilience: the macro picture, summarises the 
Resilient” and Low Carbon Resilient core scenarios and identifies the key features of 
energy system development associated with each. By systematically comparing all of the 
four core scenarios, the interplay between resilience and CO2 emissions reduction is 
explored. 
 
The section on reliability of gas and electricity supply identifies the level of investment in 
electricity generation capacity and gas infrastructure needed to maintain reliability of 
supply at the levels specified as part of the set of resilience indicators. This analysis uses 
the WASP and CGEN models and goes in to greater depth than is possible with the 
MARKAL model which covers the entire energy system. This highlights the need for 
sufficient investment to “back-up” intermittent renewable electricity and the need for 
investment in import and gas storage facilities in the light of the UK’s declining self-
sufficiency in natural gas.  
 
The section, resilience to energy system shocks, first reviews historical disturbances to 
gas and electricity supplies, in the UK and elsewhere. Based on this review, a small 
number of hypothetical shocks to UK gas supply are postulated. These, as described 
above, are assumed to take place in 2025 and are within the range of historical 
experience. The impacts of the shocks under each of the core scenarios are then 
assessed in terms of cost and levels of energy unserved. Finally, the benefits of 
infrastructure investments which will mitigate the impacts of the shocks are considered. 
 
The last section of the report, policy implications, key messages and future research, first 
summarises, in broad terms, the costs and benefits associated with the different 
approaches associated with the four scenarios and the mitigating investments. It then 
sets out policy options for promoting the different elements of energy system resilience. 
These are promotion of demand reduction, supply diversity and infrastructure 
investment. This section also reflects on the implications of policy development 
subsequent to the finalisation of the analysis. The government has published two key 
policy documents since the work underpinning this report was completed: the Wicks 
report on energy security referred to above and the Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC, 
2009a) which establishes concrete and more ambitious policies to meet the UK’s climate 
change goals. We therefore consider the robustness of the conclusions in light of these 
subsequent developments. Finally, we anticipate further research challenges relating to 
energy resilience which UKERC may pursue in Phase II of its operations 2009-14. 
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2. The resilience of an energy system 
2.1 Overview 
 
In this section, we identify a set of indicators that can be used to define the “resilience” 
of an energy system. The section starts from a theoretical perspective, establishing a 
working definition of the UK energy system, in terms of its scope, to which the concept of 
resilience will be applied. The application of resilience and the related concept of 
“vulnerability” at the systems level in other fields, notably ecology, is explored and a 
working definition of energy system resilience is then established. Resilience is typically 
defined with reference to “shocks”, and the nature of the shocks to which an energy 
system might be exposed is discussed. Moving to a more practical level, we then look at 
policy approaches to energy security in the UK and the EU and deduce from this the 
nature of the shocks to which energy policy might be sensitive and conclude with a set of 
resilience indicators which are used to underpin the subsequent analysis. 
2.2 Defining the Energy System 
 
The following working definition of the UK energy system was used in undertaking this 
work: 
 
“the set of technologies, physical infrastructure, institutions, policies and practices 
located in and associated with the UK which enable energy services to be delivered to 
UK consumers”. 
This definition covers all of the equipment along the energy supply chain that is located 
in the UK – extraction of non-renewable resources, electricity generation, energy 
conversion, transportation, transmission, storage, distribution and end-use equipment. It 
excludes physical infrastructure located outside the UK. It covers UK institutions 
(government at the national, regional and local levels, other statutory and non-statutory 
public bodies and private companies), UK policies, regulatory frameworks (economic and 
environmental) and operating practices. 
 
The definition is built round the concept of delivering “energy services” to consumers 
rather than energy per se. This allows for the fact that technologies and practices on the 
energy demand side can help to ensure a reliable supply of energy services. For example 
a well-insulated house will make the occupants more resilient against supply 
interruptions during cold weather. At a more sophisticated level, advanced technologies 
such as micro-generation and private grids could also promote resilience. We are going 
beyond the simple “security of supply” aspects of energy security and resilience. 
 
The UK energy system is bounded by what is in the sphere of influence of UK institutions. 
It excludes energy infrastructure outside UK jurisdiction and supra-national (EU) or 
international (e.g. International Energy Agency) institutions. There is necessarily some 
blurring at the edges. The UK has an influence over EU energy policy for example, but it 
shares responsibility with the European Commission, the European Parliament and 26 
other Member States. Its influence cannot therefore be said to be decisive. However, it 
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does include infrastructure in which the UK has a major share, e.g. gas and electricity 
inter-connectors. 
 
It is also helpful to draw some boundaries within the UK. For example, homeland security 
and defence policy can be seen as having an impact on the resilience of the UK energy 
system. However, such policies relate to a range of sectors and types of critical 
infrastructure such as water, transport and telecommunications. These are therefore 
excluded from the definition, although it may be useful for the energy research 
community to interact with those operating in other policy domains. 
 
This definition of the energy system provides a foundation for exploring resilience in 
many more ways than are possible in this report. The final section of the report briefly 
discusses possible future research directions. 
 
2.3 Resilience and vulnerability  
 
The concept of “resilience” has acquired a long pedigree in the field of ecology since the 
seminal work of Holling (1973).2 It is helpful to draw on the substantial amount of 
systematic thinking that has been invested over the last 35 years.  
 
Resilience is seen to be a key concept in ecology because: 
 
“A resilient system, in a desirable state, has a greater capacity to continue 
providing us with the services that support our quality of life while being subjected 
to a variety of shocks” (Walker & Salt, 2006).  
 
The analogy with the delivery of energy services and the maintenance of quality of life is 
a helpful one. A classic definition of “ecological resilience” focuses on maintaining 
existence of function and is defined as:  
 
“the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance; to undergo change and still 
retain essentially the same function, structure and feedbacks” (Walker et al., 
2004).  
 
The ability to bounce-back is the key focus under this definition. A second type of 
definition refers to “engineering resilience”. It considers ecological systems to exist close 
to a stable steady state, where resilience is defined as: 
 
“the ability to return to the steady state following a disturbance, and focuses on 
maintaining efficiency of function. Here the major measure is return time where 
the speed of the bounce-back is the most important factor.” (Holling, 1996). 
 
In terms of an energy system both the ability to bounce-back and the speed of bounce-
back will be important for industry and consumers. 
 
                                                 
2  This section has been informed by helpful discussions with the UKERC Phase I Energy and Environment 
team about resilience and ecosystem services. UKERC’s “whole systems” approach to research has allowed 
us to get “read over” from one area of science to another when considering concepts such as resilience. 
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Building on the definition of the energy system suggested above, the following definition 
of energy system resilience is proposed: 
 
“Resilience is the capacity of an energy system to tolerate disturbance and to 
continue to deliver affordable energy services to consumers. A resilient energy 
system can speedily recover from shocks and can provide alternative means of 
satisfying energy service needs in the event of changed external circumstances.”  
 
This is not offered as a universal definition of resilience in energy systems, but as a 
broad-brush, working definition which provides a basic platform for identifying more 
specific resilience “indicators” for use in this specific piece of research. The indicators are 
identified in Section 2.7 and quantified for illustrative purposes in Section 4. By 
introducing the concept of “affordable” energy services we are highlighting the question 
of resilience to high or volatile external energy prices. If we were concerned only with 
physical resilience, the concept of “affordability” would not be necessary.  
 
In the field of climate change impacts and adaptation, resilience has been characterised 
as the “flip side of vulnerability” (IPCC, 2001). The concept of vulnerability is also helpful 
in the energy field. IPCC described climate vulnerability as being “a function of the 
sensitivity of a system to changes in climate (the degree to which a system will respond 
to a given change in climate)”. The following working definition of the vulnerability of an 
energy system has been adopted: 
  
“Vulnerability is the sensitivity of an energy system to external disturbance or 
internal malfunction. A vulnerable energy system lacks the capacity to recover 
speedily from shocks and may not be able to satisfy energy service needs 
affordably in the event of changed external circumstances.”  
 
2.4 Risk, resilience and security  
 
Although the concepts of “security” and “security of supply” are frequently (and often 
loosely) used in the energy domain, the concept of “resilience” has had relatively little 
usage. Stirling (2009a) has made an interesting attempt to locate the concept of 
resilience within a wider conceptualisation of energy security. In Figure 2, security is 
characterised as the ability to mitigate against threats which may take the form of 
transient disruptions (“shocks”) or more permanent shifts (“stress”).  
 
The discussions of energy security and resilience in this report focus specifically on 
transient threats (“shocks”). In Stirling’s scheme, resilience is the ability to respond to 
shocks that are external to the system. However, given the broad definition of the energy 
system that we have adopted, our definition of resilience also encompasses what Stirling 
describes as stability, the ability to respond to shocks that are internal to the energy 
system. This would apply, for example, with reference to the adequacy of electricity 
generation capacity to meet levels of demand caused by low probability outages of plant. 
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• geopolitical security: avoiding undue reliance on specific nations so as to maintain 
maximum degrees of freedom in foreign policy. 
 
Government policy to address these challenges to energy security (DTI 2007a, p.35) 
consists of “promoting open, competitive energy markets” in the EU and other regions; 
planning for unforeseen contingencies such as major disruptions (perhaps, in the case of 
gas, through ensuring that enough storage is available; “driving investment” in a diverse 
range of (low-carbon) technologies (although from the above it is clear that the 
investment itself will actually take place through market decisions); and “promoting 
policies to improve energy efficiency”.  
 
In practice, UK policy to date has focused almost exclusively on “risk”: “measuring 
security of supply is primarily about measuring the risk ... of involuntary interruptions to 
supply” (DECC, 2008a). This focuses primarily on supply security and specifically the 
adequacy of capacity: 
 
“Our analysis suggests that the single most important influence on expected 
energy unserved3 is the overall balance, the margin, between demand and 
physical supply capacity”. 
 
The EU (CEC, 2008) takes a broader approach. The Commission has proposed a five-
point Action Plan which implicitly responds to concerns about price and geo-political 
security:  
 
• Infrastructure needs and the diversification of energy supplies 
• External energy relations 
• Oil and gas stocks and crisis response mechanisms 
• Energy efficiency 
• Making the best use of the EU’s indigenous energy resources 
 
Although the UK has taken a narrower view of energy security in recent years, the recent 
loss of self-sufficiency in oil and gas (Figures 3 and 4) is encouraging a greater degree of 
sensitivity to geo-political uncertainties, price shocks and supply interruptions. For 
example, In August 2009, a report by the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on 
International Energy argued for a more strategic approach to energy security issues 
(Wicks, 2009). However, supply interruptions need not be associated with overseas 
developments, as the UK miners’ strikes in the 1970s and 1980s and the tanker drivers’ 
dispute in 2000 demonstrate.  
 
Attacks on infrastructure are also addressed through generic homeland security policies 
(CPNI, 2009). Security measures (surveillance, protection etc) that could be 
implemented in respect of any piece of critical infrastructure have intentionally been 
defined as being outside the scope of energy system “resilience”. Measures to enhance 
energy system resilience would allow the energy system to recover in the event of 
generic security measures failing. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The key security of supply indicator under UK policy 
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Figure 3: UK Crude Oil Production and Demand  
 
Source: DECC 
 
 
Figure 4: UK Natural Gas Production and Demand 
 
Source: DECC 
 
Other commentators have pointed out that, in practice, most interruptions of supply to 
final consumers, whether in the gas or electricity sectors, can be attributed to local 
technical failures rather than to wider political events (Stern, 2004). This is documented 
in Section 6. A key question is whether technical failures can be treated probabilistically 
or not. The rate of failure of individual pieces of equipment may be treated in this way. 
For example, in the electricity sector, the “availability” of plant, which reflects the 
probability that it will not be available for technical reasons, is routinely built into 
planning processes. This approach underpins the WASP model described in Section 3. 
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However, the events documented in Section 6 are, for the most part, beyond probabilistic 
analysis because they are the result of extreme weather, multiple/co-incident technical 
failures or catastrophic accidents whose nature was not anticipated. The consideration of 
failures that are amenable to probabilistic analysis is built into the models described in 
Section 3. Other types of event, that are subject to uncertainty and ignorance, are dealt 
with through the “stress-testing” analysis in Section 6.  
 
In this report, we intentionally take a broad perspective. A set of resilience indicators 
needs to be comprehensive in terms of covering the energy supply chain, the types of 
external disturbance to which we want to be resilient and the types of response that 
might be appropriate.  
2.6 Classifying “shocks” to the energy system 
 
Table 1 describes a range of possible external events that would threaten the operation 
of the UK energy system, locating them within the risk-uncertainty-ignorance framework.  
 
Table 1: Events Impacting on the Energy System 
Type of Event Type of Incertitude 
Technical equipment failure/unplanned outages  Risk 
Weather-related risks Risk 
Volatility in global energy prices  Risk 
Energy price “shocks” Uncertainty 
Interruption of a major supply source Uncertainty 
Attack on energy infrastructure Ignorance 
 
Some of these events are already routinely factored into energy decision-making, notably 
those associated with simple technical failures and weather. Energy price volatility refers 
to measurable price variability over periods of months or years. A small but growing 
literature is using portfolio approaches from finance theory to address energy policy 
(Bazilian and Roques, 2008).  
 
The vulnerability of the energy system can be seen as falling into three main areas, each 
implying different management approaches. The coverage of the three areas and the 
range of the management approaches reflect our definition of the energy system which 
focuses on the delivery of energy services to consumers: 
 
1. the availability and cost of primary energy supplies. Vulnerability can be managed 
partly through domestic energy policy and the choice of primary energy supplies 
(as measured by supply diversity, import dependence etc). Vulnerability can also 
be managed through foreign or defence policies, or through energy-sharing 
agreements struck via the EU or International Energy Agency (IEA), but these are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2. transformation, conversion, storage and distribution systems which allow primary 
energy to be converted and made available to final consumers when and where 
12 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
they want it. Domestic energy policy has a major role to play here by ensuring the 
reliability of transmission and distribution systems and the provision of sufficient 
margins between potential supply and demand. Current UK energy policy centres 
on this area of vulnerability, but homeland security policies also have an 
important role to play in protecting critical infrastructure from attack. Note that a 
wide conception of energy policy is required as it can be argued, for example, that 
markets are sufficient to produce adequate margins between potential supply and 
demand, i.e. that the optimum policy in this respect is non-intervention. 
 
3. disruptions to supplies and fluctuating prices. Here, measures to reduce 
vulnerability include reducing energy demand to minimise the economic impacts 
of supply interruption or price fluctuations, stand-by electricity generation 
capacity, installing multiple-fuel capabilities or maintaining energy stocks at 
industrial or commercial premises.  
 
Reducing the vulnerability of the energy system from the perspective of final consumers 
is key. Vulnerabilities for final consumers run right through the energy system. The 
important policy questions concern which types of measure, applied at different points in 
the energy system, can most easily and cost effectively be deployed to protect 
consumers. In addressing these questions, consideration must be given as to which types 
of incertitude (risk, uncertainty, ignorance) specific measures address. A measure that 
reduces quantifiable risk should be assessed differently from a measure which addresses 
events about which we may be “ignorant”. 
2.7 Selecting Indicators of Resilience in an Energy System  
 
Tables 2 - 4 propose a set of candidate resilience indicators for the three main areas of 
vulnerability: primary energy supply, energy infrastructure and energy usage. These 
derive from consideration of both the theoretical insights into resilience and the practical 
concerns of policymakers. The tables also note the type of external disturbance to which 
the resilience indicators apply and the nature of the incertitude.  
 
Table 2 covering primary energy supply includes some possible indicators relating to 
energy mix. These include novel indicators based on recent work deriving from financial 
portfolio theory and diversity theory (Bazilian and Roques, 2008) as well as simpler and 
more conventional indicators such as import dependence and the degree of dependence 
on the largest single source. 
 
Table 3, addressing infrastructure issues, focuses heavily on adequacy of capacity as 
advocated by DECC. It includes standard measures used in statistical assessments of 
system reliability (loss-of-load probability; loss-of-load expectation; value of lost load) 
but also storage capacity and indicators relating to redundancy in network infrastructure. 
 
Table 4 looks at demand side indicators. Most of these address the amount of energy 
used or financial exposure to energy dependence. They also cover the availability of  
back-up arrangements or alternative sources of supply for energy sensitive users, e.g. 
hospitals and banks. 
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The challenge is to identify a usable set of indicators from the wide range identified in 
Tables 2-4 that can be practically applied in energy analysis and, ultimately in energy 
policy. For the analysis in this report, we need indicators that can be easily applied in the 
modelling tools available to us. The small set of resilience indicators which we have 
worked with are as follows: 
 
Reliability indicators for electricity: value of lost load (VOLL) expressed in £/MWh and 
loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) expressed in hours per year. 
 
Reliability indicators for gas: value of lost load (VOLL) for industrial gas4. 
 
Infrastructure investment: we assess the implications of different levels of gas storage 
and diversity of import options. 
 
Level of final energy demand: used as an operational indicator in EU energy policy (e.g. 
the Energy Efficiency and Energy Services Directive) serving as a proxy for import 
dependence and expenditure on energy. This is the easiest demand related indicator to 
implement in the models. 
 
Diversity of primary energy supply. A constraint on maximum market share of major 
supply sources, e.g. coal, oil or gas. This has been selected because it is simple to 
implement in the models and, at an intuitive level, matches well with policy aspirations.  
 
Diversity of generation mix in electricity supply. We focus on electricity supply because, 
as shown later in the report, this sector turns out to offer some of the lowest cost options 
for enhancing diversity. A constraint on the maximum market share of major generation 
types (coal, gas, nuclear) is applied.  
 
We have also striven to ensure that the indicator set is coherent and does not lead to 
perverse outcomes. Annex A describes the analysis that was undertaken to ensure that 
this is so. For example, we investigated putting a constraint on the level of final primary 
energy demand rather than one on final energy. However, the current conventional 
definition of primary energy values renewable electricity (other than that produced 
through biomass) on the basis of the energy content of the electricity generated. Nuclear 
and biomass are measured according to the energy content of the heat used to generate 
electricity. Constraining aggregate primary energy demand thus creates perverse biases 
between different types of electricity generation. In practice, a constraint on maximum 
market share in primary energy supply generally bites on the supply of fossil fuel and 
sidesteps this perversity.  
 
In theory, constraining final energy demand could also introduce perversities because of 
the treatment of electricity vis-a-vis fossil fuels. However, in practice it turns out that this 
was not the case when we conducted sensitivity tests. 
 
We return to the exact quantification of the constraints in Section 4. In Section 3, the 
modelling tools used to conduct the detailed analysis are described.  
 
                                                 
4 Loss of load not allowed for household supplies. 
14 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Table 2: Possible Resilience Indicators for Primary Energy Supply 
Indicator Type of Event Type of Incertitude Notes 
Import dependence Supply interruption Uncertainty 
Ignorance 
Could be for the whole economy or specific sectors. 
Largest single source of 
supply  
Supply interruption Uncertainty 
Ignorance 
Could be for the whole economy or specific sectors. 
Diversity/concentration of 
energy supply (e.g. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index) 
Supply interruption 
Price shocks 
Uncertainty 
Ignorance 
HHI is used by the Office of Fair Trading to assess market 
concentration.  
Energy Portfolios Price volatility Risk Energy mixes which are efficient in terms of volatility/cost 
along a frontier have been explored by Awerbuch and Roques 
using financial portfolio theory. Could be for the economy a 
whole or specific sectors. 
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Table 3: Possible Resilience Indicators for Energy Infrastructure 
Indicator Type of Event Type of 
Incertitude 
Notes 
Statistical probability of 
supply interruption in 
network industries (gas 
and electricity) 
Technical equipment 
failure 
Weather-related risks 
Inadequacy of 
investment 
Risk Specify as a security standard (i.e. a probability).  to allow for 
the greater use of intermittent supply sources. Intermittent 
wind is assumed to have a lower capacity credit which 
requires higher capacity margins if the probability of 
interruption is to be kept below a threshold. 
Expected number of 
annual hours in which 
energy is unserved 
As above Risk  
Value/level of unserved 
energy 
As above Risk  
Energy storage capacity 
and/or stocks by fuel and 
market 
Interruption of 
supply 
Uncertainty Could be measured in hours/days/weeks 
Largest single source of 
supply in a market energy 
Interruption of 
supply  
Uncertainty Expressed as a percentage of supply in any given market 
Redundancy in network 
architecture 
Attack on 
infrastructure 
 
Ignorance The number of pinch points/critical nodes which would need 
to go down to cause interruption of supply to consumers. The 
networks could include gas, electricity and distribution of 
refined oil products 
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Table 4: Possible Resilience Indicators for Energy Users 
Indicator Type of Event Type of 
Incertitude 
Notes 
Energy demand level Supply interruption 
Price shocks 
Risk 
Uncertainty 
Often taken as proxy for exposure to supply interruptions and 
price shocks in policy formulation. This could be applied to 
specific sectors e.g. residential housing, critical transport or 
types of business  
Energy intensity Supply Interruption Uncertainty kWh/£ for industry (output) and economy as a whole (GDP). 
kWh per household in the domestic sector. This indicator 
should represent the capacity for some degree of energy 
service needs to be met in the event of supply interruption.  
Energy costs Price volatility 
Price shocks 
Risk 
Uncertainty 
% energy expenditure as proportion of output, expenditure 
and GDP for industry, households and economy as a whole 
respectively. This indicator points to the broader economic 
impact of price shocks. 
Back-up arrangements for 
energy sensitive users, e.g. 
hospitals, banks 
Supply interruption Uncertainty  
 
 
 
17 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
3. Analytical tools 
3.1 Modelling overview 
 
Quantitative modelling of the UK energy system has been carried out using three separate 
models with complementary characteristics. These models have been “soft-linked” – i.e. the 
output of one model has been used as input to another rather than attempting to solve the 
models simultaneously. 
 
The three models used have been: the MARKAL-MED model of the entire UK energy system 
described in previous reports in this series (Strachan et al., 2008); the Wien Automatic 
System Planning (WASP) model developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) which determines electricity generation expansion plans at the national level (IAEA, 
2001); and the Combined Gas and Electricity (CGEN) model developed by Manchester 
University through UKERC (Chaudry et al., 2008). This latter model determines 
geographically specific investments in new gas and electricity infrastructure (gas pipelines, 
terminals and storage facilities; transmission lines; and power stations) given assumptions 
about final demand for gas and electricity and patterns of investment in electricity 
generation capacity at the national level.  
 
The common feature is that they are all optimisation models programmed to minimise the 
total discounted cost over time5 of the particular part of the energy system that they cover. 
In general, we use a real discount rate of 10%, reflecting the rate of return required by an 
investor exposed to market risk. However, we explore the use of a social discount rate 
(3.5%) where this is policy relevant. 
 
Table 5 summarises key characteristics of the three models. Note that the scope of the 
MARKAL-MED model includes the ground covered by the WASP electricity model. However, 
the WASP model addresses the electricity system in considerably more detail and can pick 
out issues, especially those related to reliability, that MARKAL cannot. Specifically: WASP 
has a far more detailed characterisation of the load duration curve (which summarises 
electricity demand at different levels throughout the year); WASP’s use of mixed integer 
programming means it takes account of the “lumpiness” of investment in power plant; and 
WASP can use a more sophisticated set of indicators to ensure reliability of electricity. 
Whereas MARKAL assumes a fixed plant margin in excess of peak demand,6 WASP uses 
three reliability indicators: the number of years in a century in which demand is expected 
not be met fully; a “value of lost load” (VOLL) measure in £/kWh; and loss of load 
expectation (LOLE) the maximum number of hours in which load is not met in any year. In 
general, this results in WASP building more capacity than MARKAL, especially when there 
are large quantities of intermittent renewable energy on the system. 
 
                                                 
5 Or maximise welfare in the case of MARKAL-MED 
6 Strictly speaking a capacity margin over the highest load step 
18 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Each of the UKERC Energy 2050 scenarios addressing resilience is characterised using the 
three models operating in tandem. Figure 5 shows the way that information flows between 
the three models. MARKAL-MED is run first. Depending on technology assumptions, price 
assumptions and other constraints such as those on carbon, it determines the extent to 
which energy service demands are met through electricity or gas. Electricity demand is then 
passed to WASP which generates a more refined picture of the need for and operation of 
generation capacity at the national level. The CGEN model then takes electricity and gas 
demands directly from MARKAL-MED and national electricity generation capacity from WASP 
in order to determine the location of generation plant and other infrastructure. 
 
Figure 5: Operation of the three models in tandem 
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Table 5: Key Characteristics of the Modelling Tools 
 MARKAL-MED WASP CGEN 
Scope The entire UK energy system Electricity generation at the 
national level 
Gas and electricity infrastructure 
including geographical distribution 
Objective Maximising discounted welfare by 
deploying available technologies in 
order to meet energy service 
demands which adjust in response to 
energy price changes 
Minimising discounted cost by 
investing in and dispatching 
plant in order to meet specified 
levels of electricity demand and 
levels of reliability. 
 
Minimising discounted cost by locating 
new plant and infrastructure to meet 
specified final gas and electricity 
demands. 
Method Linear programming Mixed integer programming Non-linear optimisation 
 
Key inputs • Baseline energy service demands 
• detailed characterisation of 
technology performance and 
costs,  
• elasticity of energy service 
demands with respect to price.  
• Key constraints such as carbon 
emissions 
• Annual and peak electricity 
demand,  
• profiles of existing and 
committed plant 
• performance and cost of new 
plant, reliability measures. 
• Final gas and electricity demands,  
• geographical characterisation of the 
gas and electricity systems  
• costs and performance of plant and 
infrastructure 
•  
Key 
outputs 
Energy demand and supply by 
sector, energy source and 
technology 
Levels of investment in and 
operation of plant by type. 
Selection, location and operation of 
plant and infrastructure 
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3.2 Energy system: The MARKAL Model 
 
MARKAL portrays the entire energy system from imports and the domestic production of 
energy, through fuel processing and supply, explicit representation of infrastructures, 
conversion to secondary energy carriers (including electricity, heat and hydrogen), end-
use technologies and energy service demands of the entire economy. As a perfect 
foresight partial equilibrium optimisation model, standard MARKAL minimises discounted 
total system cost by choosing the investment and operation levels of all the 
interconnected system elements.  It is not a forecasting model, but rather a 'what-if' 
framework that provides a systematic exploration of least-cost energy system 
configurations under a broad, integrated set of input assumptions. MARKAL models have 
been used around the world for policy relevant analytical work (BERR, 2008c; Smekens, 
2004), including the International Energy Agency's Global Energy Technology 
Perspectives (IEA, 2008a). 
 
The UK MARKAL model optimally solves from year 2000-2070 in 5-year time steps. For 
this exercise, the model has  been calibrated in its base year (2000) to data within 1% 
of actual resource supplies, energy consumption, electricity output, installed technology 
capacity and CO2 emissions (BERR, 2006). A first key input parameter is resource supply 
curves (see Table 4 in Anandarajah et al., 2009). From these baseline costs, multipliers 
are used to generate both higher cost supply steps as well as imported refined fuel 
costs. 
 
A second key input is dynamically evolving technology costs which are based on expert 
assessment of technology vintages or, for less mature electricity technologies, via 
exogenous learning curves derived from an assessment of learning rates combined with 
global forecasts of technology uptake (Winskel et al., 2009). 
 
A third key input is an explicit depiction of infrastructures, physical and policy 
constraints. A wide range of peer reviewed data sources inform the model and have 
been supplemented by a series of stakeholder workshops. A complete description of all 
input parameters is given in the model documentation (Kannan et al., 2007). All costs 
are in year 2000 £ sterling. The model uses a global discount factor of 10% to reflect 
commercial UK market rates of return. The model uses a higher hurdle rate for advanced 
end-use technologies like plug-in hybrid/hydrogen vehicles and heat pumps. All currently 
UK legislated environmental and economic “firm and funded” policies as of the 2007 
Energy White Paper are included. In addition, considerable attention is given to near-
term (2005-2020) convergence of sectoral energy demands and CO2 emissions with the 
econometric outputs of the DECC energy model. The imposition of a range of policy and 
physical constraints, implementation of all taxes and subsidies, and inclusion of base-
year capital stocks and flows of energy, facilitates realistic evolution of the energy 
system under alternate scenarios.  
 
A final key input for the UK MARKAL model is exogenous demand for various energy 
services. The MARKAL elastic demand (MED) version is used to account for the response 
of energy service demands to prices. This is implemented at the level of individual 
energy service demands using linear programming. Hence, each demand has a constant 
own-price elasticity. The MED model calculate welfare losses from reduced demands - 
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i.e. if consumers give up some energy services that they would otherwise have used if 
prices were lower, there is a loss in utility to them which needs to be accounted for. The 
sum of consumer and producer surplus (economic surplus) is considered a valid metric of 
social welfare in microeconomic literature. A full description of MED function and its input 
assumptions are given in the low carbon pathway report (Anandarajah et al., 2009).  
 
A full description of the UK MARKAL model is given in the model documentation (Kannan 
et al., 2007) and in peer reviewed publications (Strachan et al., 2008; Strachan and 
Kannan, 2008; Kannan and Strachan, 2009).  
 
3.3 Electricity generation: The WASP Model  
 
The Wien Automatic System Planning (WASP) model (version IV) developed by the 
International Atomic Energy agency (IAEA) is designed to determine medium to long-
term economically optimal expansion policy for a power generation system within user-
specified constraints. WASP has been distributed to more than 75 countries and has 
become the standard approach to investment planning in many of the IAEA and World 
Bank’s member countries (ESMAP, 2007). Many IAEA member states have applied the 
model in their national and regional studies to analyse the issues of electric power 
system expansion planning. One recent study has been commissioned by European 
Union to identify and prioritize investment in power generation and related electricity 
infrastructure for the Balkan’s region (REBIS, 2004).  
 
Timely and optimal development of adequate electricity generating capacity is vital for 
maintaining security of supply while meeting desired policy objectives regarding energy 
supplies, environment and affordable energy prices. Overbuilding generating capacity 
increases the reliability of the system but the average price of electricity will also 
increase because the costs of that excess capacity will be borne by customers. On the 
other hand, under-building capacity will result in some portion of demand not being 
served. The economic costs of this unserved energy are significant and are added to the 
generation cost, this summed cost of generation also increases as the degree of under-
building becomes more severe. Thus, an appropriate level of reliability for the generating 
system is required which depends on a large number of system characteristics. 
 
The optimal expansion plan for a power generating system in WASP model is evaluated 
in terms of minimum discounted total costs within the system reliability constraints given 
by the planner. System reliability is evaluated on the basis of three indices: reserve 
margin, loss-of-load-expectation (LOLE), and un-served energy. Each possible sequence 
of power generating units added to the system (expansion plan or expansion policy) 
meeting the constraints is evaluated by means of a cost function (the objective function) 
which is composed of capital investment costs (which can be assumed to change over 
time), salvage value of investment costs, fuel costs, fuel inventory costs, non-fuel 
operation and maintenance costs and cost of the energy not served. 
 
The model applies probabilistic simulation to evaluate the electricity generation system's 
production costs and costs associated with un-served energy and reliability. It uses a 
linear programming technique for determining optimal dispatch policy satisfying 
exogenous constraints on environmental emissions, fuel availability and electricity 
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generation by specified plants. The dynamic programming method is then applied for 
comparing and optimising the costs of alternative system expansion policies that would 
serve the future electricity demand with a desired level of system reliability (IAEA, 
2001). 
 
The model provides options for introducing constraints on environmental emissions, fuel 
usage and energy generation. These constraints are handled by a multiple group-
limitation technique wherein a group of plants are constrained and plants can be 
included in more than one type of constraint. Environmental emissions for each year and 
for each period within a year are based on the electricity generated by each plant and 
the user specified characteristics of fuels used. These options are extremely useful for 
real life planning in view of the increasing importance of environmental concerns as well 
as the fact that in many cases availability of some fuels for power generation may be 
limited or energy generation from some plants may need to be restricted. 
 
In the WASP model, the changing nature of the load from one year to another is taken 
into account by specifying the peak demand forecast demand for each year. In order to 
consider the seasonal changes of the load characteristics, the year is sub-divided into a 
number of equal periods. For long-range planning studies, such as the ones presented 
here, the chronological hourly load curves (LDC) are transformed into load duration 
curves for each period and scaled to represent future electricity demand projections. The 
LDC, with area under the curve representing the electricity demand, characterises the 
load in each period of every year. The demand load factor (the ratio of average to peak 
demand) is assumed to stay constant. 
 
The WASP model can be applied in two modes. 
 
Evaluation of a Fixed Plan – This mode is applied to investigate the reliability, cost 
and environmental performance of a predefined expansion plan. 
 
Search for the Optimal plan – In this mode the model is allowed to determine the 
economically optimal expansion plan or plans within used defined constraints. 
However, if required, the appropriate year and range of capacity addition of 
candidate technologies can be defined. 
 
We have applied the model in the latter mode, using the future UK electricity demand 
projections obtained from the output of the MARKAL model. MARKAL determines the 
future electricity sector demand based on a least cost optimisation of the overall energy 
system for the designed energy scenarios. 
 
Thermal plants are described by maximum and minimum capacities, heat rate at 
minimum capacity and incremental heat rate between minimum and maximum capacity, 
maintenance requirements (scheduled outages), failure probability, emission rates and 
specific energy use, capital investment cost (for expansion candidates), variable fuel 
cost, fuel inventory cost (for expansion candidates), fixed component and variable 
component of (non-fuel) operating and maintenance costs and plant life. The schedule of 
annual maintenance of the plants in the system can also be specified. 
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The types of hydroelectric projects that can be modelled include run-of-river, daily 
peaking, weekly peaking and seasonal storage regulating cycle. They are defined by 
identifying for each project the minimum and maximum capacities, energy storage 
capacity of the reservoirs, energy available per period, capital investment cost (for 
projects considered as expansion candidates), fixed operation and maintenance costs 
and plant life. The stochastic nature of the hydrology is treated by means of hydrological 
conditions, defined by its probability of occurrence and the corresponding available 
capacity and energy of each hydro project in the given hydro-condition.  
 
Some recent studies have introduced new approaches to model wind generation in WASP 
(Koritarov et al., 2005). In this study wind generation is represented in a simplified way, 
similar to the behaviour of a run-of-river hydro plant. The average behaviour of wind 
power output (available wind energy and its seasonal variation) from future on- and off-
shore wind farms is adopted from the historical wind speed data. 
 
The key outcomes of the application of model under the given constraints include: 
 
● Build schedule; i.e., which capacities to install to ensure an appropriate level of 
reliability, best combination among the different technologies at hand now and in 
future, appropriate time to incorporate new plant in the system. 
● Costs: investment costs and cost of system operation that includes fuel, operation 
and maintenance and cost of energy not served. 
● Expected generation of plants 
● Fuel requirements 
● Emissions  
 
3.4 Gas and electricity infrastructure: The CGEN Model 
 
The Combined Gas and Electricity Network (CGEN) model describes gas and electricity 
infrastructure. The objective of the CGEN model is to minimise total discounted costs 
related to the combined operation and expansion of the gas and electricity networks 
whilst meeting demand requirements over the entire planning horizon. Energy demand 
requirements are taken from the MARKAL model runs which determine, for a given 
scenario, how energy service demands are met, for example through conventional 
vehicles or electric cars in the transport sector. 
 
The model consists of a DC load flow analysis for the electricity network and detailed 
modelling of the gas network including facilities such as gas storage and compressor 
stations. The interaction between the two networks is through gas turbine generators 
connected to both networks (Chaudry et al, 2008).  
 
CGEN is a geographical model, thus, the connection of gas pipes and electricity 
transmission wires in a network is explicitly modelled. This geographical element allows 
a realistic picture of network flows and the physical constraints that are present in both 
networks. Figures 6 and 7 show the current shape of the Great Britain electricity and gas 
networks which CGEN seeks to represent in a simplified form. The components modelled 
within CGEN are illustrated in Figure 8. 
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The components are arranged into distinct categories, describing energy supply, energy 
transportation (networks), generation technologies, and energy end use. 
 
Resource supply: This includes bounds on the availability of primary energy supplies 
(gas, coal, oil etc) and electricity imports. For gas, CGEN uses the same assumptions as 
the MARKAL model (Kannan et al., 2007). This allows for nine separate tranches of 
domestic gas supply, three tranches for LNG, three tranches for Russian supply (via the 
continent) and one tranche for Norway. Gas import interconnectors are modelled as gas 
pipes with maximum transport capacities. For pipeline terminals, six separate entry costs 
are modelled ranging from zero at Barrow to £0.06/GJ at St Fergus. Details are provided 
in Annex C. 
 
Networks: The gas network includes the detailed modelling of pipelines, compressors, 
and storage facilities. The gas flow in a pipe is determined by employing the Panhandle 
‘A’ gas flow equation that calculates the gas flow rate given the pressure difference 
between upstream and downstream nodes. A DC power flow model is used to represent 
the electricity network. The DC power flow formulation enables the calculation of MW 
power flows in each individual transmission circuit. Gas turbine generators provide the 
linkage between gas and electricity networks. They are considered as energy converters 
between these two networks. For the gas network, the gas turbine is looked upon as a 
gas load. Its value depends on the power flow in the electricity network. In the electricity 
network, the gas turbine generator is a source. 
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Figure 6: Great Britain Electricity Network 
Source: DECC 
26 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Figure 7: UK Gas Network 
 
Source: DECC 
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Figure 8: CGEN optimisation model 
 
 
 
Generation technologies: CGEN includes models for all the conventional generation 
technologies such as CCGT, coal, and nuclear. Generation technologies are described by 
a number of characteristics such as ramp up/down, maximum generation and thermal 
efficiencies. CGEN introduces new power generation plants according to the generation 
capacity plan schedule developed in WASP. To capture the spatial nature of the wind 
resource, wind power is modelled using average wind load factors for different locations 
around the UK. The geographic wind power variation influences energy balancing in the 
electricity network, and the location of new wind power generation capacity. 
 
Energy end use: Gas and electricity energy demand is fed into CGEN from MARKAL 
demand outputs. The demand is split into residential and industrial/commercial 
components for gas and electricity. Gas used for electricity generation is determined 
endogenously within CGEN.    
 
Location of generation plants: CGEN does not endogenously build generation capacity 
to satisfy future demand. Generation plans from the WASP model are used as an input 
into to the CGEN model. Since WASP is a non-geographical generation planning model, it 
does not provide location specific information on new generation capacity. Using the 
concept of minimising costs (operational + infrastructure), CGEN optimally places these 
generation plants around the electricity network. Figure 9 describes an example of how 
CGEN would deal with the location of a CCGT plant. CGEN calculates the cost associated 
with placing the CCGT plant at every location. For instance, if the CCGT plant were 
located in Scotland this would incur a reinforcement cost of £ A and £ B for new gas 
pipes and electricity transmission lines respectively. If the CCGT plant is located in the 
Southeast the total investment cost is £ C+D for new gas and electricity transmission 
lines. CGEN would intuitively choose the Southeast option, but once operational costs are 
included, the Southeast option may well turn out to be more expensive. The CCGT plant 
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is placed at a location that minimises both gas and electricity operational and 
infrastructure expansion costs. 
 
Transmission capacity: For both gas and electricity networks, transmission capacity is 
added to satisfy peak demand requirements. Figure 10 illustrates how the optimisation 
routine within CGEN will explore all possible solutions to satisfy peak demand. This 
ranges from building additional network capacity to the re-dispatching of energy. The 
model will select the cheapest solution over the entire time horizon. By balancing gas 
supply and demand, CGEN mimics trades at the National Balancing Point (NBP) and the 
costs associated with the cash-out procedure. This is achieved by minimising total costs 
associated with gas production, compression (own fuel used) and storage operation.  
  
Electricity network expansion: Electricity transmission capacity expansion is assumed 
to be carried out on a radial network.  
 
Figure 9: Location of a CCGT plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Network infrastructure expansion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peak demand 
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Gas network expansion: Gas pipe capacity expansion is based on building additional 
pipes in parallel to existing pipes. The Panhandle ‘A’ equation is used is determine the 
flow rate through a pipe. In addition to increasing gas pipe capacity, CGEN allows 
capacity expansion of import pipelines, LNG terminals, storage facilities and compressor 
stations.  
 
The key outputs of the model are: 
 
• Location of electricity generation capacity 
• The volume and location of investment in electricity transmission capacity and 
gas infrastructure (interconnectors, pipelines, LNG terminals and storage 
facilities) 
• Utilisation of electricity generation capacity and infrastructure 
• System costs 
• The amount of energy unserved and its monetary value 
 
CGEN can operate in two modes: 
 
Planning mode: infrastructure additions are made to an initial network over a time 
horizon in order to satisfy demand and network related constraints (pressure, electricity 
flow constraints etc). CGEN was used in this mode to model the “core” UKERC Energy 
2050 scenarios  
 
Operational mode: A user-specified network is used to test various scenarios (prices 
increases, shocks etc). CGEN was used in this mode to assess the benefits of investment 
in infrastructure aimed at increasing resilience. 
30 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
4. Resilient energy systems: the macro picture 
4.1 Quantifying a resilient energy system 
 
The three macro-level indicators that we adopted for a resilient energy system in Section 
2 relate to final energy demand and diversity of primary energy supply and electricity 
generation mix. The quantified assumptions are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Macro-level Resilience Indicators 
Indicator Quantified assumption 
Final energy demand Final energy demand falls 3.2% pa relative to GDP 
from 2010 onwards. 
Primary energy supply No single energy source (e.g. gas) accounts for more 
than 40% of the primary energy mix from 2015 
onwards 
Electricity generation mix No single type of electricity generation (e.g. gas, 
nuclear) accounts for more than 40% of the mix from 
2015 onwards 
 
Reducing energy demand is a key element of EU energy security strategy. It will reduce 
vulnerability to all types of insecurity – physical, price and geopolitical. The 3.2% 
decoupling of final energy demand from GDP is equivalent to an annual reduction of 
1.2% in absolute terms (assuming GDP growth of 2% p.a.). The falling trajectory of final 
energy demand was used to apply a set of constraints in MARKAL-MED, measured in PJ, 
for each five-year time step out to 2050. The MARKAL model then selected the welfare-
maximising mix of measures that allowed these constraints to be met. The constraints 
shown in Table 7 were applied in the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios. Final 
energy demand is down by 17% relative to the Reference scenario by 2025 and 41% by 
2050. 
 
Table 7: Final energy demand constraints in the Resilient Scenario 
Year 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2040 2050 
GDP index 100.0 112.9 129.3 143.5 158.4 174.9 193.1 235.4 286.9 
Final energy 
(PJ)                   
Reference 6189 6321 6300 6260 6288 6287 6312 6401 6455 
Resilient  6189 6318 6291 5933 5567 5224 4902 4316 3801 
Final energy/ 
GDP (% pa)          
Reference  -1.99% -2.74% -2.18% -1.87% -1.96% -1.88% -1.86% -1.92% 
Resilient  1.99% 2.76% 3.20% 3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% 
 
In deriving the final energy demand constraints, we considered rates of decline in the 
final energy demand/GDP ratio ranging from 2.4% to 3.6% per annum. These were 
benchmarked against bottom-up estimates of the potential impact of energy efficiency 
measures out to 2020 made by DECC in the most recent carbon and energy projections 
(DECC, 2008b) available at the time the analysis was conducted. The full analysis is set 
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out in Annex A, Detailed Analysis of Resilience Indicators. Our assumptions about 
constrained final energy demand correspond roughly to the assumption of high impact of 
energy efficiency measures up to 2020. We then assume that the same pace of 
improvement will continue thereafter. This Resilient scenario can therefore be said to be 
at the upper end of the plausible range in terms of energy demand reduction.  
 
We explored diversity constraints relating to primary energy supply, the electricity 
generation mix and the mix of installed electricity generating capacity. This exploration is 
also described in Annex A. The diversity constraints were formulated in terms of 
maximum market shares because: a) this is a simple and intuitive characterisation; and 
b) such constraints are easily implemented in the MARKAL-MED model. Only a non-linear 
model could deal with diversity indices such as Herfindahl-Hirschman. In each case we 
explored a 40% constraint on the market share of the largest source and tested 
interactions with different levels of constraint on final energy demand. The 40% figure 
was intended to prevent any single energy source from dominating the market.  
The way that different combinations of constraint affected welfare losses as imputed by 
the MARKAL-MED model was a key consideration. 
 
The final, and relative simple, selection of diversity constraints was made for the 
following reasons: 
 
• The constraint on maximum share for primary energy supply ensured supply 
diversity in the economy as a whole. 
 
• Generation mix was constrained because the electricity sector was found to play a 
key role in shifting the primary energy mix. The availability of alternative 
generating options at similar costs means that diversity can be achieved at a 
relatively low cost in the electricity sector. The generation mix constraint helps 
guarantee security of electricity supply and prevents the electricity sector being 
used to compensate for imbalances elsewhere in the energy sector. 
 
• Constraints on installed electricity generation capacity were found to produce 
perverse outcomes. These drove investment in low capital cost plant (specifically 
CCGT) which was subsequently used at a low load factor and failed to prevent 
high market shares (60%+) for other forms of generation. Constraints on 
installed capacity, if combined with constraints on generation mix, did not 
substantively change the outcomes. 
 
A fuller description is provided in Annex A. 
4.2 Key features of a resilient energy system 
 
This section highlights the consequences of constraining the development of the energy 
system using the quantified resilience indicators. In general, this produces quite different 
patterns of development, both when 80% CO2 reductions by 2050 are required, and 
when no carbon constraint is applied. The comparison between the four core scenarios – 
Reference, Low Carbon, Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient - focuses on 2025 
representing the mid-term and 2050 representing the long-term. In practice, when we 
start to explore the impact of shocks to the energy system in Section 6, the analysis 
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focuses entirely on 2025. Annex B, The Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient Scenarios in 
Detail, provides a fuller comparison of the four core scenarios. 
 
Energy demand 
 
Tables 8 and 9 compare primary energy demand, final energy demand, final electricity 
demand and residential energy demand in each of the four core scenarios for 2025 and 
2050 respectively. Final energy demand is formally constrained in the model in the 
Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios. Without these constraints, final energy 
demand rises very modestly in the Reference scenario and falls by 2% by 2025 and 29% 
by 2050 in the Low Carbon scenario (all measured from a year 2000 baseline). However, 
in the resilient scenarios demand falls much more, by 16% by 2025 and 40% by 2050.  
 
Out to 2025, the higher falls in energy demand in the resilient scenarios are explained by 
declines across the residential, services and industrial sectors. Taking the residential 
sector as an example, demand holds steady, or increases slightly, out to 2025 in the 
Reference and Low Carbon scenarios but falls by 20%+ in the resilient energy systems. 
Figure 11 shows clearly that this is also associated with a squeezing of natural gas 
demand. This has the consequence of directly reducing energy imports.  
 
The pattern is different out to 2050 (Table 9). Residential energy demand is down by 
roughly 50% in all but the Reference scenario and, as Figure 12 shows, natural gas 
demand actually falls faster in the two low carbon scenarios. The same is the case for oil 
demand, mainly associated with the transport sector. 
 
In all scenarios, and over both time horizons, primary energy demand falls relative to 
final energy demand. This is because of the adoption of more efficient technologies in 
the energy transformation sector, mainly electricity generation. Primary demand, as 
would be expected, falls most rapidly in the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios 
with declines of 20% by 2025 and 45-50% by 2050.  
 
The role of electricity of in the energy economy is interesting, and a subject we will 
return to. In the Reference scenario electricity expands its role, with demand rising by 
14% by 2025 and 26% by 2050. By 2050, the electrification of the energy economy is 
even more pronounced in the Low Carbon scenario with electricity demand rising by 39% 
by 2050. In the Resilient scenario, electricity demand changes little throughout the 
projection period. However, in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario, electricity demand falls 
8% by 2025, but has risen by 16% by 2050 compared to year 2000 levels, again as a 
result of some electrification of the energy economy.  
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Table 8: Changes in energy demand by 2025 with respect to a 2000 baseline 
  Reference       Resilient 
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Primary Energy Demand -7% 
Final Energy Demand +2% 
Electricity Demand +14% 
Residential Demand +5% 
Primary Energy Demand -20% 
Final Energy Demand -16% 
Electricity Demand +1% 
Residential Demand -23% 
Primary Energy Demand -13% 
Final Energy Demand -2% 
Electricity Demand +6% 
Residential Demand +0% 
Primary Energy Demand -20% 
Final Energy Demand -16% 
Electricity Demand -8% 
Residential Demand -20% 
 
 
Table 9: Changes in energy demand by 2050 with respect to a 2000 baseline 
  Reference       Resilient 
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Primary Energy Demand -4% 
Final Energy Demand +4% 
Electricity Demand +26% 
Residential Demand -2% 
Primary Energy Demand -44% 
Final Energy Demand -38% 
Electricity Demand +2% 
Residential Demand -50% 
Primary Energy Demand -32% 
Final Energy Demand -29% 
Electricity Demand +39% 
Residential Demand -55% 
Primary Energy Demand -49% 
Final Energy Demand -40% 
Electricity Demand +16% 
Residential Demand -50% 
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Figure 11: Primary Energy Demand in 2025 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Primary Energy Demand in 2050 
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Diversity of energy supply and the electricity generation mix 
 
Tables 10 and 11 show that the Low Carbon scenario and even more so the Reference 
scenario breaches the diversity constraints set in the resilience scenarios. In the 
Reference scenario, the primary energy mix is compliant but coal attains 54% of the 
electricity generation mix by 2025 and 81% by 2050. In the Low Carbon scenario, the 
primary energy mix includes 44% gas in 2025 and the electricity generation mix includes 
41% coal in 2050. The resilience constraints are barely breached in the Low Carbon 
scenario which, consequently, can be said to perform relatively well in diversity terms. In 
the two resilient scenarios, the only constraint that bites relates to the maximum share 
in the electricity generation mix. It is generally coal that tends to run up against the 
constraint, but for the Low Carbon Resilient scenario in 2050, nuclear power is 
constrained off.  
 
Note that coal gains market share in the unconstrained Reference scenario because of 
the underlying price assumptions made when prospects for natural gas supply were less 
optimistic than is currently the case. In general, the diversity constraints tend to hold 
coal back rather than to enhance its role. 
 
 
Table 10: Changes in diversity indicators in 2025 with respect to a 2000 
baseline 
  Reference       Resilient 
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Max primary energy share 39% 
(gas)  
Max electricity share 54% 
(coal) 
Max electric capacity share 33% 
(coal) 
Max primary energy share 39% 
(gas)  
Max electricity share 40% 
(coal) 
Max electric capacity share 29% 
(gas)  
Max primary energy share 44% 
(gas)  
Max electricity share 31% 
(gas) 
Max electric capacity share 27% 
(gas)  
Max primary energy share 39% 
(gas)  
Max electricity share 40% 
(coal) 
Max electric capacity share 29% 
(gas)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Table 11: Changes in diversity indicators in 2050 with respect to a 2000 
baseline 
  Reference       Resilient 
  
 
 
L
o
w
 ca
rb
o
n
 
Max primary energy share 38% 
(coal)  
Max electricity share 81% 
(coal) 
Max electric capacity share 51% 
(coal) 
Max primary energy share 31% 
(gas)  
Max electricity share 40% 
(coal) 
Max electric capacity share 27% 
(coal)  
Max primary energy share 32% 
(coal)  
Max electricity share 41% 
(coal) 
Max electric capacity share 25% 
(coal)  
Max primary energy share 24% 
(gas)  
Max electricity share 40% 
(nuclear) 
Max electric capacity share 29% 
(wind)  
 
 
CO2 intensity and economic indicators 
 
Tables 12 and 13 cover a range of indicators relevant to CO2 emissions and economic 
aspects of the four core scenarios. In the two low carbon scenarios, CO2 emissions are 
constrained to fall by 36% by 2025 and 80% by 2050 relative to 1990 levels. In the 
Reference scenarios, unconstrained emissions fall by 12% by 2025 but by only 2% by 
2050. In the Resilient scenario, emissions fall by 29% by 2025 and 52% by 2050 as a 
result of constraining final energy demand.  
 
The tables also cover the average carbon intensity of grid electricity measured in grams 
CO2/kWh generated. Figure 13 expands on this by showing the trajectories of carbon 
intensity for each of the scenarios through to 2050. In the Reference (unconstrained) 
scenario, carbon intensity increases due to a switch from gas and nuclear to coal partly 
compensated for by increases in renewable generation. In the Resilient scenario, carbon 
intensity declines gradually because of investment in nuclear and renewables which is, 
however, partly compensated for by a switch from gas to coal as noted above. The 
dramatic, and early, reduction in carbon intensity in the Low Carbon scenario is the 
result of large scale investment in coal plant fitted with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS)7, nuclear and wind generation. Carbon intensity declines significantly in the Low 
Carbon Resilient scenario but lags about a decade behind the Low Carbon Scenario. 
Electricity demand is lower in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario. Nuclear’s market share 
is similar to that in Low Carbon while there is a significant switch from coal CCS to 
renewables. The expansion of markets for electricity in the Low Carbon scenario is 
largely explained by the combined effect of the de-carbonisation of electricity and the 
application of the carbon constraint. 
 
                                                 
7 The system-wide scenarios that frame this analysis were constructed before the demonstration of CCS on 
gas-fired plant became UK policy. Later runs of the MARKAL model have included the option of gas CCS. 
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Tables 12 and 13 also show annual energy system costs (including amortised capital, 
fuel and operating costs) change relative to the Reference scenario. Costs rise in the Low 
Carbon Scenario because much of the CO2 abatement occurs on the energy supply side, 
notably through de-carbonisation of electricity. However, in the two resilient scenarios, 
system costs generally fall as a result of reduced demand for energy. The exception is in 
the Low Carbon Resilient scenario in 2050 where system costs rise slightly as de-
carbonisation costs offset savings from reduced energy demand. 
 
There are always welfare losses associated with constraining energy system 
development away from the Reference scenario. Tables 12 and 13 suggest that the 
welfare loss associated with building in resilience are much higher than those associated 
with pursuing the low carbon economy. This needs interpreted carefully. The largest 
contribution to the welfare loss in the two resilient scenarios is associated with reduced 
energy demand in the residential sector. This is driven by a price elasticity assumption 
which stands as a proxy for both investment in energy efficiency and reductions in 
energy service demand (mainly for heating). To the extent that available energy 
efficiency measures are low cost, the welfare loss figures may be biased upwards to a 
considerable degree. 
 
Table 12: CO2 and economic indicators in 2025  
  Reference       Resilient 
  
 
 
 
L
o
w
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CO2 emissions+ -12% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  513  
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  0 
system cost* (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare* 0 
(£bn) 
CO2 emissions+ -29% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  464 
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  -2 
system cost (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare -19 
(£bn)  
CO2 emissions+ -36% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  188 
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  +2 
system cost (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare -4 
(£bn)  
CO2 emissions+ -36% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  360 
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  -3 
system cost (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare -19 
(£bn)  
Note: + - with respect to a 1990 baseline; * - with respect to the Reference scenario 
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Table 13: CO2 and economic indicators in 2050  
  Reference       Resilient 
  
 
 
 
L
o
w
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CO2 emissions+ -2% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  591  
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  0 
system cost* (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare* 0 
(£bn) 
CO2 emissions+ -52% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  352 
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  -11 
system cost (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare -49 
(£bn)  
CO2 emissions+ -80% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  31 
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  +17 
system cost (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare -38 
(£bn)  
CO2 emissions+ -80% 
CO2 intensity of electricity  15 
(g/kWh) 
Change in annual energy  +1 
system cost (£bn) 
Change in economic welfare -59 
(£bn)  
Note: + - with respect to a 1990 baseline; * - with respect to the Reference scenario 
 
 
Figure 13: Carbon Intensity of Grid Electricity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Demand Side Technology Choice 
 
The contribution of technology selection to the de-carbonisation of the electricity sector 
was noted above. On the demand side, technology choices in the transport and 
residential sectors play a significant role in differentiating the scenarios.  
 
The surface transport sector in the Reference scenario is dominated by conventional 
petrol and diesel engines right out to 2050, though goods vehicles switch to diesel hybrid 
engines from 2015-20 onwards. However, in the Low Carbon scenario, petrol engine 
vehicles are switched to a mixture of plug-in electric hybrids and bio-ethanol around 
2035. Bio-ethanol fails to emerge in the Resilient scenario where a switch to hybrid and 
plug-in hybrid cars takes place, again from 2035 onwards. The Low Carbon Resilient 
scenario resembles the Resilient scenario, but there is some take-up of bio-ethanol cars. 
Hydrogen is used to a limited extend by goods vehicles in the Low Carbon and Low 
Carbon Resilient scenarios, but only by 2050.  
 
In the residential sector, gas heating dominates the Reference scenario right through the 
projection period. In the Low Carbon scenario, electric heat pumps start to replace gas 
around 2040 and have done so almost completely by 2050. Biomass heating plays a 
transient role in the period 2035-45. However, electric heat pumps and biomass fail to 
come through in the two resilient scenarios. Here, the main contributions to CO2 
reduction come from reduced heat demand and the emergence of some district heating, 
to a somewhat greater extent in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario.  
4.3 Resilience and the Low Carbon Economy: Synergies and Trade-offs 
 
A key message emerges from the comparison of the resilient and the other two core 
scenarios. Although there are synergies between the low-carbon/resilience agendas, 
they are far from being synonymous with each other. The key theme in the Low Carbon 
scenario is de-carbonisation of electricity supply with demand reduction making a 
modest contribution. The key theme in the Resilience scenario is demand reduction with 
only a modest reduction in the carbon intensity of electricity generation by 2025. The 
Low Carbon scenario contributes to reduced energy dependence, but does not go far 
enough to meet overall security goals; the Resilient scenario reduces CO2 emissions, but 
does not go far enough to stay on the pathway to the 2050 80% reduction goal.  
 
Reducing energy demand, and thereby import dependence, is the key to achieving both 
the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios. This different emphasis has 
consequences for the selection of demand side technologies. In the built environment, 
electric heating plays a far bigger role in the Low Carbon scenarios but is absent in the 
resilient scenarios. There are also more varied, and subtle, changes in technology choice 
for transport.  
 
The significant reductions in residential energy demand in the Resilient and Low Carbon 
Resilient scenarios appear to incur a major loss in welfare through a reduction in 
consumer surplus. As noted earlier, this should be kept in perspective as there are more 
low-cost energy efficiency opportunities available than the modelling has implied. 
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5. Reliability in the network industries 
5.1 Overview 
 
This section is concerned with the adequacy of investment in supply capacity and 
infrastructure to ensure that electricity and gas are supplied reliably to consumers. It 
covers risks, as defined in Section 2, to which probabilities can be assigned. These 
include variability in demand, including those related to weather, and the probabilities of 
plant outages through technical failure. Reliability standards are set so as to ensure that 
the risk of outages is kept to acceptable levels. There can be no guarantee that demand 
can be met at all times. 
 
The MARKAL-MED model used in Section 4 uses a simple “planning margin” approach8 to 
determine the adequacy of generation capacity in the electricity sector. Planning margins 
are “rules of thumb” based on more fundamental statistical analyses. The loss-of-load 
probability (LOLP) – the number of winters per century in which demand will not be fully 
met - is another intermediate indicator. A capacity margin of around 20% and a LOLP of 
nine winters per century were the standards used by the former Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB).  
 
If new types of plant, particularly intermittent renewables, take a large share of the 
electricity market then the old assumptions about LOLP and capacity margin may break 
down. When demand is not fully met, periods of interruption may be longer and more 
load may be lost. There is a need to adopt a more fundamental statistically-based 
approach to reliability.  
 
The basic approach is to assess the value of gas or electricity to customers and multiply 
by the probabilities of outages occurring to obtain the expected welfare cost of unserved 
demand. Both the WASP model of the electricity system and the CGEN model of gas and 
electricity infrastructure use the concept of value-of-lost-load (VOLL)9 to balance the cost 
of outages against the cost of investment in additional capacity to improve reliability. In 
addition, the WASP model applies a constraint on the loss-of-load expectation (LOLE) – 
the number of hours per year in which demand is expected not to be met. Where there 
is substantial investment in intermittent wind generation, using the LOLE and VOLL 
constraints will increase the capacity needed to meet reliability standards in the 
electricity sector.  
 
The input assumptions about VOLL and LOLE are shown in Table 14. These derive largely 
from the work of Kariuki and Allan (1996). Industrial VOLL varies from £10-255/kwh and 
domestic VOLL from £0.26-6.3/kWh. More recent research from van der Welle and van 
der Zwann (2007) concluded that figures for VOLL lie in the range $4-40/kWh for 
developed countries. Taking account of these two studies allows us to differentiate 
between customer types. The VOLL in Table 14 reflect a typical four hour outage.  
 
                                                 
8 For intermittent generation, such as wind, adjustments are made to allow for the “capacity 
“credit”, i.e. the proportion of the capacity that can be counted on at times of peak demand. 
9 “Lost load” corresponds to the concept of “energy unserved” used by DECC. 
41 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Other approaches are possible. Redpoint (2010) used a single VOLL of £10/kWh across 
all customer types in work underpinning UK Electricity Market Reform proposals.   
 
Table 14: Reliability indicators for gas and electricity 
 Value of lost load 
 
 
 
 
Loss-of-load expectation 
(LOLE) 
• £5/kWh (residential electricity) 
• £40/kWh (industrial electricity)  
• £5/therm (industrial gas) 
• Lost load not allowed (residential gas) 
 
• 4 hours per year (0.05% of year) for 
electricity 
 
This section first considers the approach to reliability in the electricity sector then goes 
on to look at gas. 
5.2 Reliability of electricity supply 
 
Applying the reliability indicators in Table 14 to the electricity system using the WASP 
model shows that the conventional capacity margin approach used in MARKAL will lead 
to increasingly unreliable supply if significant amounts of intermittent renewable capacity 
comes on to the system. Figure 14 shows how the required system capacity margin (the 
fraction by which installed capacity exceeds peak demand) changes between 2005 and 
2050 under the Low Carbon scenario if the more formal reliability approach based on 
VOLL and LOLE is applied. The difference relates mainly to the degree of renewables on 
the system. With intermittent renewables electricity shortages tend to become longer, 
involving deeper load cuts, even if the frequency of such events remains the same.  
 
 
Figure 15 shows how, in the same Low Carbon scenario, the loss of load expectation 
(LOLE) exceeds accepted norms if the conventional capacity margin approach is adopted. 
Accepted loss-of-load expectations under current conventional systems range between 2 
and 8 hours per year. With more intermittent renewables on the system, the 
conventional approach could lead to loss of load as high as 150 hours per year by 2040. 
In the later part of the projection, nuclear forms an increasing part of the mix and LOLE 
falls off. 
 
The WASP model installs additional conventional, mostly CCGT/open cycle gas turbine  
(OCGT) capacity, to compensate for intermittency. Storage is not the least cost option. 
“Back-up” capacity meets short-term operational requirements and ensures the long-
term reliability of the system in order to maintain acceptable levels of LOLE  while 
minimising overall system costs. 
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Figure 14: Capacity margin using different reliability approaches, Low-Carbon 
scenario 
  
 
 
Figure 15: Loss-of-load expectation using capacity margin approach, Low 
Carbon scenario 
 
 
The additional capacity and electricity system costs associated with the more formal 
reliability approach is shown in Table 15. Beyond 2020, the additional capacity required 
on the system to maintain reliability is in the range 5-10 GW depending on the scenario 
and the precise point in the projection. The cost of maintaining this capacity, which 
would be seldom used, is largely associated with capital costs and could run into several 
hundreds of millions of pounds per year. As an indicator, the £354m incurred in the Low 
Carbon Resilient scenario in 2020 is equivalent to £1.03/MWh of all electricity generated 
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and £9.85/MWh of wind energy generated. The modelling suggests just over 12 GW of 
wind on the system at this point.  
  
Table 15: Additional Capacity and System Costs to Ensure Reliability  
 Additional System Capacity 
(GW) 
Additional System Cost  
(£m pa) 
 2020 2035 2050 2020 2035 2050 
Reference 1.3 5.5 5.5 67 274 277 
Low-Carbon 3.7 11.5 4.4 187 575 219 
Resilience 6.8 5.9 9.1 341 296 457 
Low-Carbon Resilience 7.1 5.4 6.2 354 269 312 
 
5.3 Reliability of Gas Supply 
 
When the UK was self-sufficient in gas supplies, the response to uncertainty in the gas 
market largely came down to turning the tap on and off. With the prospect of the UK 
becoming largely dependent on imports, other measures are required to ensure 
reliability of gas supplies. These include greater interconnection with Europe, opening up 
to global LNG markets and investing in storage. 
 
We have operated the CGEN model using the indicators from Table 14 to assess the 
investments needed to ensure reliable gas supply through to 2050 under each of the 
four core scenarios. After taking account of current and committed projects, the CGEN 
model chooses between additional pipeline interconnectors, LNG terminals and gas 
storage facilities. Table 16 shows investments selected under the four core scenarios in 
addition to current and committed capacity. New interconnectors are not selected but 
there is considerable investment in new LNG terminals to compensate for declining 
domestic supply. This is largely driven by assumptions about the relative cost of 
continental gas and gas available through LNG markets. New, additional storage is 
selected in the Reference and Low Carbon scenarios but not in the resilient scenarios 
where final gas demand is much lower. As explained above, intermittent wind generation 
is handled in the WASP model which identifies “back-up” CCGT and open cycle gas 
turbine plant (OCGT), rather than storage, as being the least cost way to deal with 
intermittency. 
 
Table 16: Gas infrastructure investments  
 Reference (REF) Low Carbon (LC) Resilient  
(R) 
Low Carbon 
Resilient (LCR) 
Interconnectors No additional No additional No additional No additional 
 
LNG terminals 40 mcm/d 2015 
20 mcm/d 2020 
60 mcm/d 2025 
40 mcm/d 2030 
40 mcm/d 2015 
20 mcm/d 2020 
60 mcm/d 2025 
40 mcm/d 2030 
 
40 mcm/d 2020 
40 mcm/d 2025 
60 mcm/d 2030 
 
40 mcm/d 2020 
40 mcm/d 2025 
60 mcm/d 2030 
     
Storage 2000 mcm 2015  1000 mcm 2015 No additional No additional 
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Figure 16 shows the gas market balance out to 2030 under each of the four core 
scenarios. This illustrates starkly the degree to which the UK will become import 
dependent. The broad pattern across all scenarios is that LNG capacity substitutes for UK 
domestic production and, in the 2020s, for Norwegian imports. In the two resilient 
scenarios, where gas demand is lower, Norwegian imports are reduced more quickly.  
 
Figure 16: gas supply/demand balance in the four core scenarios 
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6.  Resilience to energy system shocks  
6.1 Overview 
 
This section addresses the resilience of the UK energy system to shocks or disturbances 
to which it is difficult or impossible to attach probabilities.  It responds to concerns about 
the UK’s growing import dependence and perceived underinvestment in infrastructure. 
The focus is largely on natural gas supply.  
 
The section starts with a review of the historical experience of “shocks” or “events” that 
have caused disruption to energy markets round the world over the last 10-20 years 
(electricity and gas) or 50 years (oil). We use this evidence to define a set of 
hypothetical shocks to the UK energy system. These all relate to natural gas supply.10 
We assume that these shocks occur towards the beginning of winter, in the year 2025, 
under each of the four core scenarios. Using the CGEN model, we assess the impact of 
these shocks in terms of the additional costs associated with re-balancing the energy 
system to maintain supplies to consumers (e.g. by re-dispatching power stations) and 
the imputed costs associated with “lost load” if supply curtailments prove necessary. 
 
The final stage is to test a set of measures that would help to mitigate the impacts of the 
shocks. These measures take the form of investments in physical assets such as gas 
storage, LNG terminals or additional interconnectors additional to those needed to meet 
the reliability standards described in Section 5. We assess the extent to which these 
measures mitigate the costs of the various shocks to the energy system. As noted in 
Section 2.5, the shocks that we hypothesise are not susceptible to probabilistic 
treatment as they may be caused, inter alia, by extreme weather, unanticipated 
catastrophic accidents or multiple/coincident events. Without being able to assign 
probabilities to the shocks, we cannot place this analysis in a formal cost-benefit 
framework. However, if the mitigating investments are regarded as insurance against 
the shocks taking place, we can calculate how often the shocks would have to recur (the 
“return period”11) before investments can be justified.  
6.2 Energy system shocks: historical experience 
 
Overview  
 
Shocks associated with electricity, gas and oil are assessed. A general finding is that 
electricity shocks have tended to last for hours-days, gas shocks for weeks-months, and 
oil shocks for months-years in the some cases. 
 
                                                 
10 We prioritised gas because: a) there are well-established requirements for major consuming 
countries to maintain significant quantities of oil stocks under International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and EU rules; and b) shocks to the electricity system tend to be of a much shorter duration and 
can be mitigated by addressing the reliability issues considered in the previous section.  
11 The “return period” does not relate to the financial rate of return on capital 
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Electricity 
 
Table 17 shows major electricity blackouts and disturbances over the last 20 years. 
Electricity supply accidents have occurred more frequently in the last 10 years, partly 
reflecting rising energy demand and hot summer conditions.  
 
Electricity blackouts have lasted for several hours up to several days. Compared to oil 
and gas shocks, electricity shocks have happened more frequently but the durations 
have been shorter. Almost of all the blackouts were caused by the extreme weather and 
the failure of major infrastructure assets. However, the California power crisis in 2000 
and 2001 is an exception. The series of blackout and service interruptions were mainly 
attributable to inefficient market policy and market manipulations by some energy 
companies.  
 
Gas 
 
Table 18 shows that there have been no massive global gas supply disruptions in the last 
20 years. Most disruptions occurred in specific locations. Some can be attributed to 
extreme weather events, such as hurricanes in US in late 2005. Others were caused by 
poor or aging gas transmission infrastructure. For example, the gas supply crisis in 
Australia in 1998 was caused by a fractured vessel in a gas plant (AGD, 1998). There 
have been several events affecting major UK gas facilities in the last decade: Bacton, 
Easington, the UK CATS pipeline and the UK interconnector. 
 
Some gas supply disruptions have arisen for political reasons. The most obvious one in 
recent years has been the Russia/Ukraine gas supply crisis. Russia cut off natural gas 
supplies to Ukraine in 2002, 2006 and 2009 in an attempt to increase gas prices and 
force the payment of debts.  
 
Depending on the reasons for disruption, gas supply disruptions have generally lasted 
from several days up to a couple of weeks. It has taken between one and four days to 
reach an agreement to resolve the various Russia/Ukraine gas crises. However, US gas 
supply disruptions attributable to hurricanes lasted for 4 months in 2005. 
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Table 17: Major electricity blackouts and disturbances 
Date Place Duration Cause Loss 
23 - 25 July 
2007 
Barcelona More than 3 days The blackout began when a broken 
substation cable caused a chain 
reaction failure in other substations. 
Around 350,000 households and 
businesses lost power at some point, and 
more than 100,000 remained powerless 
at night on 25th July. 
16 – 29 
July, 2006 
Queens, New York About 10 days Intense heat wave More than 3 million Americans were 
affected, some for hours, others for ten 
days. 
23 – 24 
October, 
2005 
South Florida, 
Naples, Ft. 
Myers, Miami, Ft. 
Lauderdale, West 
Palm Beach and 
Martin county 
1 day Hurricane Wilma 10,000MW loss and 
3.2 m Americans were affected. 
12 July, 
2004 
Athens and 
southern Greece 
70% of the region had no 
power for an hour. Power 
was restored to all of 
Athens in 3 hours. Remote 
areas were affected longer. 
Many of the planned new upgrades 
were not integrated in the system 
until after the yearly peak, which 
occurred on Monday, July 12, and 
the high demand due to a heat wave 
led to a cascading failure. 
Several million people were affected. 
28 
September, 
2003 
The entire Italy with 
the exception of the 
island of Sardinia 
9 hours The problem was blamed on a fault 
on the Swiss power system, which 
caused the overloading of two Swiss 
internal lines close to the Italian 
border.  
Almost all of the country's 57 million 
people were affected. 
23 
September, 
Denmark and 
southern Sweden 
Half day The power failure occurred as a 
consequence of a number of faults in 
4 million businesses and homes were 
affected. A total loss to the grid of 3000 
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Date Place Duration Cause Loss 
2003 the South Swedish power system. MW or about 20% of Sweden's electricity 
consumption at the time.  
14 August 
2003 
The states of 
Ohio,Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, New 
York, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New 
Jersey and the 
Canadian province 
of Ontario 
Almost one week It was caused by deficiencies in 
specific practices, equipment, and 
human decisions by various 
organizations that affected 
conditions and outcomes.  
An estimated 50 million people and 
61,800 megawatts (MW) of electric load 
were affected. 
Several 
occasions 
between 
Summer 
2000 and 
summer 
2001 
California Several hours to two days Attributed variously to significant 
supply shortfalls, flawed market 
design and market manipulation. 
 
 
Several hundred thousand consumers 
suffered blackouts and service 
interruptions Wholesale electric prices 
were significantly raised, 
10 August 
1996 
8 US western states  About 10 hours A major transmission line was failed 
due to a period of high temperatures 
and high demand for electricity. 
4 million people were affected. 
Sources: BBC (2007); Berizzi, A. (2004); BreakingNews (2007); EIA (2006); Elkraft System (2003); Freeman, M. J. (2006); Northwest Power and Conservation Council 
(1996); U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force (2004); Vournas,C (2004); World Energy Council (2003); FERC (2003) 
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Table 18: Gas supply crisis and accidents 
Date Place Duration Cause Loss 
Sep 2010 – Jan 
2011 
Norway's 
Kollsnes gas 
plant 
Several months Technical problems related to recovering 
natural gas liquids from two fields 
Operations of Kollsnes was reduced 
dramatically. 
April - June 2010 UK Several months Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
producers ran an extensive summer 
maintenance programmes reducing global 
supplies  
Forward British gas prices for the 
following winter 2010/11 rose 
significantly as a result. 
Several times in 
2002, 2006 and 
January 2009 
Ukraine  1 to several 
days 
Russian companies cut off natural gas 
supplies to the Ukraine and Georgia to force 
payment of debts. 
The gas supplies in many European 
countries depending on Russian natural 
gas were threatened. 
28 Feb 2008 – 3 
March 2008 
UK Bacton 
terminal 
4 days The terminal was shut down due to a fire 
breaking out at a waste water treatment 
plant. 
An instantaneous reduction in supply of 
around 30 mcm 
July 1, 2007 – mid 
Sept. 2007 
UK CATS 
pipeline 
About 2 months The pipeline’s protective casing was 
damaged by the anchor of a large vessel in 
June 2007. 
Some oil and gas fields, such as J-block 
and Armada, had to stop producing.  
February 16, 2006 The Bravo rig, 
in Centrica's 
Rough field, UK 
About 4 months There was an apparent failure of a cooler 
unit in one of four dehydration units and an 
explosion occurred in that vicinity.  
Two people were injured. The main 
consequence of the Rough incident was 
higher prices after the event. 
Sept. – Dec. 2005 US 4 months Hurricanes  10% of US gas production was reduced 
during the last four months of 2005. 
Nov. 2005 UK 
Interconnector 
Early part of 
the winter 
2005/2006 
Possible reasons include infrastructure 
bottlenecks, legal restrictions and lack of 
transparency about gas movements in the 
EU and Norwegian markets 
The UK failed to attract gas from 
continental Europe through the 
Interconnector even though UK prices 
were higher than those in Europe. 
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Date Place Duration Cause Loss 
17 and 18 June 
2003 
Bacton, UK 2 days A number of localised system balancing 
actions taken to address a supply deficit in 
the south of Great Britain failed to result in 
a sufficient physical response.  
National Grid Transco (NGT) interrupted 
10.5 mcm of National Transmission 
System (NTS) load on 17 June and 11 
mcm of NTS and Local  
Distribution Zones (LDZ) loads on 18 
June, as well as flows to the Belgian 
interconnector. 
15 December, 1999 
Error! Bookmark 
not defined. 
Easington terminal  
Easington 
terminal, UK 
 Easington terminal was struck by lightning, 
limiting the operation of the Rough 
subterminal and other facilities  
This reduction in flows contributed to a 
sharp increase in prices  
Sept. 25  - Oct. 14 
1998  
Victoria, 
Australia 
19 days A vessel in a natural gas processing plant 
fractured, releasing hydrocarbon vapours 
and liquid.   
1.3 million households and 89,000 
businesses were affected. The 
commercial/ industrial cost was AUD 
$1.3bn. Two people were killed. 
Sources: AGD (1998); Centrica  (2006); IEA (2006); Ofgem (2003); Ofgem (2004); Reuters (2007); National Grid (2008); House of Commons (2008); LNG World News 
(2010); Reuters (2011) 
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Oil 
 
There have been ten major world oil supply disruptions in the last 50 years (IEA, 2007). 
There have been four major disruptions in the last decade. Before that, there had been 
disruptions roughly once in every ten years. 
 
Among the major disruptions, only one is attributable to severe weather. This was also 
the shortest disruption lasting one month. All the others were caused by economic 
disruptions, political developments at the national/international level, and/or wars in the 
Middle East. These always lasted more than two months. Five out of the ten disruptions 
lasted for more than six months.  
 
If both loss of supply and global production are considered, the most significant 
disruption in the last 50 years was the Suez crisis in late 1956 and early 1957. The loss 
in peak supply was about 11.4% of global crude oil production (Table 19). Figure 17 
shows that most disruptions were due to events in the Middle East. The largest loss of 
supply was associated with the 1979 Iranian revolution. 
 
Figure 17:  Major world oil supply disruptions in the last 50 years
 
Source: IEA (2007) 
 
Table 19: Global crude oil production and peak supply loss in each disruption 
 1957 1967 1974 1979 1981 1991 2001 2003 2003 2005 
Crude Oil 
production (mb/d)  
17.6 37.1 59.0 66.6 60.6 66.9 77.1 79.5 79.5 84.2 
Gross peak supply 
loss (mb/d) 
2.0 2.0 4.3 5.6 4.1 4.3 2.1 2.6 2.3 1.5 
Ratio 11.4% 5.4% 7.3% 8.4% 6.8% 6.4% 2.7% 3.3% 2.9% 1.8% 
Source: Earth Policy Institute (2009) and IEA (2007) 
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War in Iraq
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Iranian revolution
Arab-Israeli war and Arab oil embargo
Six day war
Suez crisis
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6.3 Hypothetical System Shocks  
 
We have hypothesised three possible ‘shocks’ to the UK energy system that impact on 
gas supply facilities (Table 20). We have assumed that the impact of each shock is 
experienced over three different durations - 5, 40 and 90 days. In each case we have 
assumed that the shock occurs in mid-winter, nominally 1 January 2025, during a period 
of ‘average cold spell’ demand. We do not attribute any specific underlying cause to 
these events, but note that Table 18 suggests that severe accidents rather than 
politically motivated acts would be the more likely cause. 
 
These are deliberately severe events. However, they are within the range of recent 
experience. As shown in Table 18, an explosion at the Bravo rig in the Rough field took 
the storage facility out of service for two months in 2006. Gas supplies through 
Easington were interrupted for five days after it was struck by lightning in 1999.  
 
Note that, as CGEN is an engineering-economic model which minimises cost it does not 
provide real insight into the impacts of a shock on spot prices for gas. The gas price 
implied by CGEN will rise to reflect the most expensive supply option at the margin, or 
the cost of customer interruption if this is required. A model like CGEN provides insight 
into resource costs but not necessarily the way that these costs are shared between 
consumers and producers. A rise in spot prices does not by itself alter the underlying 
resource cost, but does transfer money from consumers to producers. Experience has 
shown that supply interruptions can have considerable impacts on spot prices. For 
example, the loss of the Rough Field referred to in line 6 of Table 18, coupled with cold 
weather, led wholesale gas prices to spike at 250 pence/therm (Centrica, 2007). 
 
Table 20: Description of facilities  
Facility  Description Size  
Easington gas 
terminal 
Connects the UK gas system to 
the Rough storage facility and the 
Langeled pipeline from Norway 
Can deliver 120 mcm/day (equivalent 
to 35% of UK winter demand). Rough 
can store 3.3 bcm of gas, equivalent 
to 10 days average winter demand 
Bacton gas 
terminal 
Connects the UK to continental 
Europe via Zeebrugge and 
Balgzand. Also links to some 
domestic production 
Can deliver 144 mcm/day (equivalent 
to >40% of UK winter demand). Also 
used for export 
Milford Haven 
LNG terminal 
Two terminals commissioned in 
2009 
Milford Haven can currently deliver 75 
mcm/day (equivalent to > 20% of 
winter demand) 
 
Table 21 shows the impact of the three events against the background of each of the 
core scenarios. The key messages are: 
 
• The loss of the largest terminal, Bacton, which affects both imported and domestic 
gas supplies, has the largest impact. 
 
• The energy system can ‘ride through’ the loss of Easington or Milford Haven under 
the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios – and the impact of losing Bacton is 
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much diminished. This is because these two scenarios are characterised by lower 
levels of gas demand which is also less seasonal. The system can cope better when 
demand is less ‘peaky’. Demand reduction demonstrably contributes to energy 
system resilience. 
 
• The imputed value of unserved energy (in £bns) is an order of magnitude larger than 
the changed system costs. System costs generally rise as more expensive gas is 
sourced and coal substitutes for gas in electricity generation. This however does not 
take account of the response in energy spot markets that would be expected 
following such events, which would tend to increase costs further. 
 
• The patterns of response are complex because the facilities play different roles in the 
gas network. In none of the scenarios is it necessary to curtail electricity supplies. 
Response is taken up entirely by exercising interruptible gas contracts, re-dispatch of 
the electricity system, use of distillate oil at certain CCGTs and non-contracted 
industrial gas interruptions. 
 
Table 21: Impact of 40-day shocks in the four core scenarios 
 Energy 
unserved 
(mcm) 
Value of energy 
unserved1 (£m) 
Change in system 
operating costs2 
(£m) 
Reference (REF)    
- Bacton 1839 3404 -7 
- Easington 1049 1942 +137 
- Milford Haven 866 1604 +104 
Low Carbon (LC)    
- Bacton 1718 3179 +29 
- Easington 1155 2138 +144 
- Milford Haven 1015 1878 +89 
Resilient (R)    
- Bacton 244 452 +203 
- Easington - - - 
- Milford Haven - - - 
Low Carbon Resilient (LCR)    
- Bacton 704 1303 +135 
- Easington - - - 
- Milford Haven - - - 
Notes: 1) using the values of lost load in residential and industry from Table 14; 2) this does not allow for the 
likely rise in spot prices for gas 
 
Table 22 shows in more detail the actions taken during the 40 day shock at Bacton 
terminal and the costs associated with voluntary gas demand reduction.  
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Table 22: System response to 40-day shock at Bacton in the four core scenarios 
 Change in 
CCGT/OCGT gas 
demand (mcm)1 
Cost of voluntary 
gas response (£m)2 
Reference (REF) -386 341 
Low Carbon (LC) -690 391 
Resilient (R) -620 379 
Low Carbon Resilient (LCR) -598 375 
Notes: 1) refers to the change in power station gas demand determined by CGEN relative to the situation 
where no shock occurs; 2) The cost of voluntary gas response compared with no shock. This includes switching 
from gas to distillate oil, the re-dispatching of CCGTs and industrial response. 
 
In all cases the following procedures are initiated during a shock before involuntary 
energy measures are required:  
 
Voluntary industrial gas response. The response from the industrial sector is fixed at 
5.5 bcm/y for 2025. This is based on the value used in the analysis conducted by 
National Grid and Global Insight (National Grid, 2006; Global Insight, 2005). The 
response loosely represents industrial users on interruptible contracts who have the 
capability to switch to other fuels at an average cost of £8.34/GJ or ~ 3p/kWh (OXERA, 
2007).  
 
Voluntary power sector response. It was assumed that there are 3GW CCGT power 
plants (JESS, 2006) with distillate back-up for up to 120 hours operation in 2025. In a 
gas emergency it is assumed that all these plants will switch to distillate. The cost of 
distillate fuel is set at the price of crude oil and assumes that CCGT plants running on 
distillate have a thermal efficiency of 50%. 
 
Additional CCGT response. This is determined endogenously by CGEN through least 
cost dispatch for a particular shock and scenario. The response depends on the levels of 
demand for gas and electricity, CCGT capacity, electricity generation capacity mix, 
operational costs and VOLL.  
 
Due to higher peak demand for both gas and electricity, a lack of alternative electricity 
generating capacity and transmission capacity constraints it was difficult to reduce CCGT 
gas demand in the Reference scenario. There is greater CCGT demand response in the 
Resilient and Low Carbon scenarios resulting in higher costs attributable to voluntary gas 
response.  
 
Table 23 assesses how different lengths of interruption could affect outcomes. The loss 
of Easington is taken as an example. The clear message is that shorter periods of 
interruption, of the order of days, can be accommodated through system adjustments 
with very little loss of load. Beyond a certain threshold, costs increase rapidly, but they 
are less than linearly related to the length of the interruption. 
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Table 23: Impact of the loss of Easington for different periods 
 Energy 
unserved 
(mcm) 
Value of energy 
unserved (£m) 
Change in system 
operating costs 
(£m) 
Reference    
- 5 day 14 26 +29 
- 40 day 1049 1942 +137 
- 90 day 1857 3438 +294 
Low-Carbon    
- 5 day 12 23 +32 
- 40 day 1155 2138 +144 
- 90 day 2127 3937 +242 
 
6.4 Mitigating the Shocks 
 
The analysis above is based on the assumption that investment takes place to meet the 
reliability standards set out earlier. It is also possible to undertake additional 
infrastructure investment that would help to mitigate the impacts of major shocks. This 
section investigates the benefits that such investment might bring and sets them against 
the costs. Table 24 shows seven possible projects which would increase the resilience of 
the gas supply network. The costs for storage are based on Oxera (2007) for gas and 
ILEX (2006) for distillate oil.  
 
The costs of cushion gas are included for salt cavity storage facilities.  Although more 
cushion gas is needed for seasonal depleted gas storage facilities, we would expect these 
depleted gas reservoirs to contain a large amount of economically unrecoverable gas 
that can be used as cushion gas. Additional gas may be needed to keep storage facilities 
pressurised to maintain gas flow rate. This is included in the model as an operational 
cost. The cost of distillate storage refers only to the costs of the tanks and associated 
equipment. The cost of distillate oil stocks are treated separately in the modelling. 
 
Table 24: Gas infrastructure projects 
Project Capacity Capital  
Cost (£m) 
Storage facility similar to 
Rough 
3000mcm delivering 40 mcm/d, located 
near St Fergus 
475 
Two storage facilities Salt cavities each with a capacity of 
500mcm delivering 40 mcm/d 
550 
Expansion at one LNG 
terminal 
40mcm/d at Teesside 400 
Expansion at two LNG 
terminals 
20 mcm/d at each of Teesside and Isle 
of Grain 
405 
New gas interconnector 40 mcm/d through Theddlethorpe 340 
Backup distillate storage at 
CCGTs 
5 days storage at 6GW plant 15 
Major distillate storage at 
CCGTs 
40 days storage at 6GW plant 215 
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We focus on the loss of Bacton, the most severe shock, for a 40-day period and assess 
the impact of these mitigating investments in the Low Carbon scenario. The pay-off from 
these investments will manifestly be less under the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient 
scenarios under which the electricity/gas system is much more able to ride through 
shocks. The 40-day Bacton shock stands as a good proxy for other shocks, periods and 
scenarios as the pattern of impacts is similar. 
 
Table 25 shows the degree to which each individual mitigating investment would reduce 
the volume of energy unserved. The biggest impact comes from the expansion of import 
facilities, be they new LNG terminals or a new interconnector. Five days distillate storage 
has little impact (as might be expected for a 40 day outage) but dedicated gas storage 
and 40 days distillate storage have half to two thirds the impact of more import facilities.  
 
The conclusion about the impact of gas storage is critically dependent on how much gas 
is assumed to be in store at the time of the shock. For the major storage facility we have 
considered two options: a) that the facility is half full in mid-winter; and b) that it is used 
as strategic storage and kept completely full for emergencies. This has a significant 
effect on the conclusions. Note also, as described above, that the analysis does not 
explicitly take into account changes in spot market prices.  
 
Making a mitigating investment can be regarded as taking out insurance against the 
eventuality of adverse events. If the event is expected to occur regularly, taking out the 
investment could reduce costs in the longer term. If it were extremely rare it might be 
better to forego the insurance costs and accept the consequences. The ‘return period’ in 
Table 25 refers to the frequency with which the event would need to take place for each 
of the mitigating investments to pay off in the long run. It is based on a simple 
calculation that involves dividing the expected loss as a result of the adverse event by 
the annualised capital cost of the mitigating investment. Table 25 shows, for example, 
that if the investor requires a market rate of return of 10 per cent real, investing in two 
new LNG terminals might be expected to pay off in the long run if a 40-day outage at 
Bacton were to occur more frequently than once every 35 years. Given the improbability 
of its happening as frequently as this, it is almost impossible to conceive that market 
players would undertake this investment. Note that our scenarios anticipate new market-
driven investment in gas infrastructure as shown in Table 16. Investment to mitigate 
against catastrophic shocks would be additional to the investments in Table 16. 
 
On the other hand, investment in these mitigating measures could be regarded as 
strategic investments to be taken in the public interest. At a rate of return on investment 
of only 3.5 per cent real, the Treasury ‘social’ discount rate, the investment might still 
‘pay off’ if the event were to occur as infrequently as once in 100 years. There might 
therefore be a case for the regulator to allow (or mandate) the costs of such an 
investment to be passed on to consumers, whereby companies would be prepared (or 
required) to accept a lower risk-free rate of return in exchange for revenue certainty. To 
ensure that the investment did deliver strategic security, they would need to be 
prevented from commercial arbitrage activities.  
 
With lengthy return periods, the changing structure of the energy system in the long 
term becomes an issue. If an event is likely to occur only once every 50 years or so, it 
may not be desirable to invest in a project that appears to pay off using the insurance 
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analogy, if gas use is virtually eliminated from the energy system over that time period. 
Further research would be needed to elucidate this question. 
 
Table 25: Impact of Mitigating Investments: Bacton out for 40 days 
   10% investor rate of 
return 
3.5% regulated rate of 
return 
 Energy 
unserved 
(mcm) 
Reduction 
in cost of 
shock (£m) 
Additional 
annual costs 
(£m) 
Return 
period 
(years) 
Additional 
annual 
costs (£m) 
Return 
period 
(years) 
Baseline 
investment 
 
Additional: 
1718 - - - - - 
Storage 
facility1  
1104 1093 52 21 17 63 
Storage 
facility2 
832 1598 52 31 17 93 
Two storage 
facilities 
1246 832 60 14 20 42 
One LNG 
terminal 
786 1572 44 36 15 108 
Two LNG 
terminals 
789 1569 45 35 15 105 
Gas 
interconnector 
790 1600 37 43 12 129 
Distillate 
storage 
1685 53 2 32 1 96 
Major distillate 
storage 
1246 767 24 32 8 96 
Notes: 1) facility half full in mid-winter; 2) facility completely full 
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7. Policy implications, key messages and future 
research 
7.1 Overview 
 
This section draws together the key messages from the report, discusses the policy 
implications and suggests some future lines of research. It starts with an overview of the 
economic and financial implications of the analysis. It continues by briefly describing the 
current institutional framework for UK energy policy and then sets out policy options and 
opportunities for promoting resilience in three areas: promoting diversity; reducing 
energy demand; and building resilient infrastructure. Finally, some suggestions are made 
for future lines of research. 
7.2 Adding up the Costs of Resilience 
 
Ultimately, deciding how much to invest in and promote resilience in the energy system 
is a political decision that must be informed by evidence, albeit in the light of deep 
uncertainty. In this section we draw together evidence from the preceding analysis to 
assess the overall economic impact of investing in resilience.  
 
Table 26 summarises how system costs and welfare costs change in moving from the 
Reference and Low Carbon scenarios to the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios 
respectively. The high-level goals refer to the resilience constraints imposed on final 
energy demand and the energy mix. Electricity reliability costs refer to the additional 
system costs of maintaining capacity sufficient to meet reliability criteria over and above 
maintaining a conventional capacity margin. These costs are essentially associated with 
the greater use of intermittent renewables. Finally, infrastructure costs are those 
associated with mitigating the effects of major disruptions to the gas system.  
 
Energy system costs change when the high-level constraints are applied, but so do 
welfare costs. It is important to note that the very high loss of welfare potentially 
associated with building in the high-level resilience goals (£15-19bn in 2025 – see Table 
26) is very much an upper bound, and true welfare loss could be very much lower, or 
even non-existent. As discussed in Section 4, the response of residential consumers was 
modelled solely through a demand elasticity that caused them to reduce their demand 
for energy services, and did not allow conservation measures (which might be very low 
cost) to be chosen endogenously. 
 
To get some insights into the possible effect of this assumption, we allowed certain 
residential conservation measures back into the model. These are relatively low cost 
and, as a result, a quarter of the demand reduction was achieved through conservation 
rather than a price-driven demand response. This lowered welfare losses by £2-3bn pa 
in 2025. If all of the demand reduction could be achieved through conservation then the 
welfare losses could be eliminated entirely.  
 
In the main UKERC 2050 report (Skea et al., 2009), we considered a ‘lifestyles’ scenario 
resulting in demand reductions even greater than those in the resilience scenarios 
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discussed in this report. These are underpinned by both a greater adoption of 
conservation measures and a reduction of energy service demands, for example through 
turning down of thermostats in the home or reducing travel. In 2025, the energy system 
cost is £35bn pa lower in the Lifestyle Change Low Carbon scenario than it is in the Low 
Carbon Scenario. This appears to be a classic win-win-win situation where energy 
conservation will bring economic, environmental and security benefits. However, the 
critical issue is whether reduced energy service demands are associated with welfare 
loss. If people are forced into discomfort through high energy prices the welfare loss is 
real. On the other hand, if thermostats are turned down though pro-active lifestyle 
choice then welfare might arguably increase. 
 
The costs of ensuring electricity system reliability and reinforcing gas infrastructure are 
orders of magnitude less than the costs associated with driving the macro-structure of 
the energy system in different directions. Enhanced electricity reliability appears to cost 
around £10-15 per household per year while additional investment in gas storage or 
import facilities appears to run at around £2 per household.  
 
Table 26: Estimated costs associated with different aspects of resilience in 
2025 
 Reference Low Carbon 
High-level goals 
 
 
Reference 
↓ 
Resilient 
 
Low Carbon 
↓ 
Low Carbon Resilient 
- Change in annual 
system cost1 
-£2.0bn -£4.6bn 
- Loss of welfare2 Up to £19bn Up to £15bn 
- Change in system 
cost through 25% 
conservation3 
- £0.9bn 
- Mitigation of welfare 
loss through 25% 
conservation3 
£3.1bn £2.3bn 
- Reduced system cost 
through lifestyle 
change4 
£33bn £35bn 
Electricity Reliability    
- Cost of higher 
capacity margins5 
~£300m ~£300m 
Infrastructure    
- Enhanced gas import 
or storage capacity6 
£45m £45m 
Notes: 1) from MARKAL runs; 2) change in consumer and producer surplus from MARKAL assuming a price-
induced response in the residential sector; 3) mitigation of welfare loss when conservation measures (which 
deliver about 25% of residential demand reduction) are allowed in MARKAL; 4) the reduced cost of the energy 
system when adding lifestyle change to the Reference and Low Carbon scenarios respectively); 5) the cost of 
additional capacity determined by WASP as opposed to MARKAL. These additional costs vary considerably from 
one year to another; 6) annualised cost of two LNG terminals  
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A key point from Table 25 is that high-level resilience goals bring costs or benefits that 
are an order of magnitude higher than those associated with guaranteeing reliability of 
supply or insuring against infrastructure loss. The uncertainties associated with the costs 
of the high-level goals are equally large. However, as shown above, if the high-level 
goals are pursued then the case for infrastructure measures is considerably reduced.  
7.3 Institutional Structure of the UK Energy System 
 
The presumption underlying UK energy policy is that the first choice of delivery of energy 
services is through competitive energy markets (see, for example, DTI 2007a, p.137):  
 
“We believe the UK’s energy needs are best delivered by a liberalised energy 
market. The Government’s role is to set the overall market and regulatory 
framework that enables companies to make timely investments consistent with 
the Government’s policy goals on climate change and security of energy 
supplies.” 
  
However, it is also clear that where there are market failures government intervention 
may seek to rectify these. Where the failures are in respect of inadequate competition, 
the intervention is likely to take the form of regulation. Where they involve externalities 
or public goods, public policy may seek to address them through regulation, economic 
instruments or some other intervention. To the extent that energy system resilience, or 
security, is a public good,12 then public intervention to provide it to the desired extent is 
clearly justified. However, there is clearly room for debate over both the nature and 
extent of that intervention, the outcome of which will have a considerable influence on 
the institutional structure of the energy system and how public policy seeks to act 
through it. 
 
In the UK energy system the supply of energy-using equipment, from machinery to 
vehicles to household appliances, has long been left almost entirely to a market 
regulated only in terms of health and safety characteristics (though some equipment is 
now environmentally regulated too). The retail supply of energy carriers (fossil fuels, 
biomass and electricity) was the subject of privatisation in the 1980s and these markets 
have been progressively deregulated, so that there is now no formal price regulation in 
these markets (although energy prices can be subject to substantial and overt political 
pressure). However, energy supply is subject to regulatory oversight by the gas and 
electricity markets regulator, Ofgem. Ofgem has a direct role in price regulation of the 
gas and electricity distribution and transmission companies, for whom competition is 
either very restricted or non-existent.  
 
Ofgem’s price regulation of gas and electricity distribution and transmission has 
important implications for energy system resilience because, to the extent that this 
resilience requires investment, on which the transmission and distribution companies 
need to make a return, this investment must be permitted by Ofgem in the regular price 
reviews relating to the companies, through which the companies are allowed to adjust 
their prices to generate the return. The following section explores the policy options in 
more depth. 
                                                 
12 Helm (2003, p.260), for example has written with regard to the electricity system: “Security of supply ... is a 
system property with important public-goods characteristics.” 
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7.4 Delivering Energy System Resilience 
 
Policies for Diversity in Energy Supply 
 
There are a range of options for energy and electricity supply. Primary energy sources 
include the fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas), uranium, various renewables (of which 
onshore and offshore wind, biomass and possibly large tidal seem likely to play the 
largest role, although microgeneration technologies may also make a contribution). In 
transport, oil is dominant, but for the future it is possible that electricity will have a 
major role, either directly or through the production of hydrogen by electrolysis. For 
heat, natural gas plays the largest role, but biomass could substitute for this to some 
extent, so that the substantial use of natural gas also for power generation may present 
issues of diversity and security of supply. Electricity may be generated by any of the 
above primary energy sources, although in a low-carbon world the use of fossil fuels for 
this will require effective carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology to be deployed as 
well. Clearly a carbon constraint in the absence of CCS will very substantially reduce the 
electricity options available and could lead to significant diversity issues.  
 
In a centrally-driven energy system it would be relatively easy in principle to ensure 
energy system diversity by building capacity of different types of plant. In a market-
driven context, such as that currently in place in the UK, such an outcome may be more 
difficult to ensure. 
 
The first principle to encourage diversity is to ensure that there are no non-financial 
constraints to the deployment of the different desired capacity options. Such constraints 
are neither easy to identify nor easy to remove, as is clear from the analysis of the UK’s 
experience with onshore wind energy in IEA 2008b (p.17). Despite having among the 
highest remuneration levels for onshore wind in Europe, the UK has among the lowest 
deployment levels, and this is put down to non-financial constraints. In BERR (2008a) 
some of the relevant issues are identified as the effectiveness of the financial incentives 
that are offered, planning issues, grid issues, supply chain issues, information issues, 
network issues, and market structure (for example, the appropriateness of the wholesale 
electricity market for smaller generators). Having identified these issues, it is far from 
clear whether the proposals being made will in fact lead to the step change in the 
deployment of renewable of different kinds that is required for them to achieve the 15% 
share in final energy demand by 2020 that is the UK’s commitment under the EU 
Renewable Energy Directive. For example, The Government adopted a Microgeneration 
Strategy in 2006 (DTI 2006) which identified 25 actions to remove barriers to 
microgeneration, and by June 2008 was claiming (BERR 2008b, p.1) that 21 of these had 
been successfully completed, and the only action that remained outstanding (three 
having been overtaken by other events) would be completed by the end of the year. Yet 
it is still not at all clear that microgeneration is on a track to become more than an 
absolutely marginal contributor to UK energy supply (in the three years from the end of 
2004 the number of microgenerators increased from 82,000 to only around 100,000, 
BERR 2008b, p.2). 
 
For renewables more broadly, it is clear that time is running out if the 15% renewable 
energy share in final energy demand is to be achieved by 2020. For example, BERR 
(2008a, p.57) estimated that this could require around 3,000 extra offshore turbines of 
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5MW, a deployment rate of about 5 per week, from a base of 0.8GW at the end of 2008. 
The rate for extra onshore wind turbines is around seven 3MW machines per week, when 
at the end of 2008 the total operational capacity was only 1.7GW (BWEA 2009). The 
realisation of these numbers strains credibility in the absence of a completely 
transformed policy landscape that clearly addresses all the issues relating to both 
financial incentives and non-financial constraints. The Coalition Government’s proposals 
for Electricity Market Reform (DECC, 2010) set out comprehensive changes to the 
incentive structure for low carbon generation that address the question of financial 
incentives. 
 
Looking further into the future, the Government is keen to ensure that there is a 
favourable policy framework for a new generation of nuclear power stations, and DECC 
2008a (p.51) declares confidently: “The Government is also ensuring that there are no 
unnecessary barriers to the deployment of new nuclear power, and the appropriate 
regulatory frameworks are in place for nuclear new build.”, with the Nuclear White Paper 
(BERR 2008c, p.136) envisaging the start of construction in 2013 and power output from 
2018, although DECC 2008a (p.51) gives a range of years, 2017-2020 for the latter. The 
issues set out in the White Paper as needing to be addressed include planning, site 
assessment, assessment of potential health impacts, design assessment and licensing, 
and review of the regulatory regime in general. The draft National Policy Statement on 
released in December 2009 could unlock some of the planning constraints associated 
with nuclear power (DECC, 2009c). 
 
On the economics of nuclear, and therefore the potential need for public subsidy of new 
nuclear build, the Government has had a remarkable change of mind over the past five 
years. The Energy White Paper of 2003 said unequivocally “the current economics of 
nuclear power make it an unattractive option for new generating capacity” (DTI 2003, 
p.61), but the next Energy White Paper in 2007 stated in contrast “Based on this 
conservative analysis of the economics of nuclear power, the Government believes that 
nuclear power stations would yield economic benefits to the UK in terms of reduced 
carbon emissions and security of supply benefits” (DTI 2007a, p.191), although “it would 
be for the private sector to fund, develop, and build new nuclear power stations in the 
UK, including meeting the full costs of decommissioning and their full share of waste 
management costs” (DT1 2007a, p.17). This implies that new nuclear build would 
neither need nor get public subsidy. The wording in DTI 2007b (p.59) is slightly 
different: “As for any type of power station, energy companies would decide whether to 
propose, develop, construct and fund any new nuclear power stations. Private sector 
financing would also need to cover the full costs of decommissioning and full share of 
waste management costs.”, and does not imply so strongly that there will be no public 
subsidy. Indeed, later on BERR 2008c (p.154) says: “It is not intended that incentives 
will be provided through the fiscal regime to invest in nuclear power generation in 
preference to other types of electricity generation. The Treasury and HMRC are, 
however, exploring the possibility that the timing of nuclear decommissioning could 
create a potential tax disadvantage for nuclear operators and, if so, whether it may be 
appropriate to take action to ensure a level fiscal playing field between nuclear power 
and other forms of electricity generation.” This may open the door to some public 
subsidy of decommissioning costs at least. 
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The issue is important, because if nuclear power is an important element of UK energy 
system resilience, and if private companies decide that it is not in fact financially viable 
without public subsidy (as has been the fact in the past), then without public subsidy 
new nuclear stations will not be built and energy system resilience will not be delivered. 
 
Policies for Reducing Energy Demand 
 
In the Reference scenario, primary energy demand in 2025 is 7% below that in 2000, 
and, in the Resilient scenario, because of the imposed 3.2% p.a. reduction in energy 
intensity, it is 14% below the Reference case. The objective of the EU Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan (EC, 2006) is “to control and reduce energy demand and to take targeted 
action on consumption and supply in order to save 20% of annual consumption of 
primary energy by 2020 (compared to the energy consumption forecasts for 2020). This 
objective corresponds to achieving approximately a 1.5% saving per year up to 2020.” 
In the Low Carbon Resilience scenario, primary energy demand falls by 18% between 
2005 and 2020 compared to only 9% in the Reference scenario. Since the EU savings 
target is specified with reference to what primary energy demand would otherwise have 
been in 2020 without policy actions initiated prior to 2006, it is very hard to compare the 
scenarios with the EU target. Since the Reference scenario includes some policies set out 
in the 2007 Energy White Paper it can be assumed that it already embodies some policy 
effort. The Resilience and Low Carbon Resilience scenarios appear roughly compatible 
with the EU goal. As described in Section 4, the Resilience scenario assumptions require 
optimistic assumptions the efficacy of the policy measures specified in the 2007 White 
Paper as well as some defined subsequently. This scenario can therefore be described as 
stretching in policy terms. 
 
In principle, there is little mystery in how the economy’s energy intensity could be 
reduced: a combination of rising energy prices and measures to enhance the 
development and deployment of energy efficiency measures in the various end-use 
sectors of machinery, electric motors, buildings, vehicles and appliances. Achieving a 
3.2% p.a. reduction would be challenging, and any number of devils will lurk in the 
policy details, but the generic policies themselves are reasonably well understood. The 
assumption that a 3.2% annual improvement can be achieved through to 2020 is 
perhaps safer than assuming that such improvements can be sustained indefinitely. 
 
Delivering improvements in energy intensity beyond historic time trends has not often 
been achieved. Partly this has been because governments have been unwilling to 
increase energy prices above market rates to the extent that would be required. 
However, it has also been because of now well documented barriers to and constraints 
on the take up of energy efficiency measures that are cost-effective at prevailing prices 
(Sorrell et al., 2004).  
 
The UK Government’s Consultation on a Heat and Energy Saving Strategy (DECC 2009b) 
is couched resolutely in terms of ‘helping people to change behaviour and take action’ 
(the title of chapter 2) when, throughout, it is claimed that what is being proposed will 
save people money. Such a seeming paradox is commonly encountered in policy 
discussions about energy efficiency, and may be explained by one or all of the following 
reasons (again, see Sorrell et al. 2004 for a more detailed exposition): people are 
unaware of the price they pay for energy or what their energy bills are; even with recent 
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energy price increases (and certainly before them), energy bills are a low proportion of 
most people’s expenditure; energy efficiency technologies have a low profile and are of 
little interest to energy consumers; people (both consumers and installers) are unaware 
or sceptical of the technologies that would help save energy; consumers do not trust the 
expertise of the installers of energy efficiency technology; the installation of some 
energy efficiency technologies causes disruption to the household; consumers tend to 
have high discount rates for energy efficiency technologies, and therefore demand 
excessive rates of return which the technologies cannot deliver. 
 
Now is not the place to go into detail about the wide range of complementary policies 
that are necessary in order to overcome these barriers to energy efficiency. For a step 
change in the take up of energy efficiency, the policies are likely to have to be stronger 
than in the case of energy supply, because consumers are less responsive to energy 
price incentives than energy businesses, and the barriers to energy efficiency are 
arguably higher and more pervasive. DECC (2009b) goes considerably further in seeking 
to address them that previous Government policy on household energy efficiency. It 
remains to be seen whether the concrete policies that emerge from the Consultation 
manage to achieve the very considerable increase in energy efficiency installations that 
is being sought. 
 
Policies for ensuring reliability and adequacy of infrastructure 
 
In the UKERC Energy 2050 project the issues of reliability and redundancy in the 
electricity system (given the very limited current electricity storage options) are reflected 
in the capacity margin (the gap between generating capacity and peak power demand), 
which is an important parameter in all the models used. Current UK Government policy 
is to deliver an adequate capacity margin by having a licensing obligation on power 
companies to meet energy demands, and then relying on markets, through price signals, 
to deliver the capacity that may only be rarely used, but will then command a high price 
for power generated.  
 
However, there is now widespread acceptance that current market arrangements may 
not be sufficient to guarantee reliable energy supply while ambitious low carbon targets 
and renewable energy goals are pursued. Ofgem is investigating the need, and options 
for, alternative market arrangements through Project Discovery (Ofgem, 2009). 
Meanwhile, the Government has accepted the Committee on Climate Change’s 
recommendations that market arrangements may need to be changed if climate policy 
goals are to be met (HMG, 2010).  
 
Explicit capacity payments for plant that may not be much used is one option that will 
need to be assessed in order to underpin incentives for adequate investment in capacity. 
The merits of this have been discussed by Oren (2000). The Coalition Government’s 
Electricity Market Reform package (DECC, 2010) indeed includes a capacity mechanism. 
 
In relation to policy for infrastructure investment for energy system resilience, there are 
three possible models: 
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1. Government provides the appropriate framework for the market to make the 
investment (the model through which electricity supply and gas storage and 
international pipelines are supposed to be provided); 
 
2. The regulator permits the investment through price reviews, but the investment 
is provided by the regulated companies (this is the model for electricity and gas 
transmission and distribution); 
 
3. Government carries out the investment itself (this was the principal model before 
privatisation). 
 
The current approach of Ofgem and the UK Government is to expect market signals to 
provide the incentive to invest in such capacity. For gas, the fossil fuel over which there 
is the principal security of supply concern, National Grid break down supply into UK 
Continental Shelf (declining), imports (increasing) and storage, while imports are 
distinguished by supply type (Norway, Continent and LNG) and import route (the various 
pipelines to Norway and elsewhere on the European mainland, and LNG, but not, 
interestingly, by country of origin). The market approach to the provision of supply 
infrastructure has had some success over the past few years, with new pipelines to 
Norway (Langeled) and The Netherlands (Balgzand-Bacton) opening in 2006, and two 
large LNG facilities at Milford Haven opening in 2009. While storage has been slower to 
increase, there is expected to be very substantial construction over 2010-14, such that 
by 2018 there will be storage space for some 10% of UK projected annual demand 
(DECC 2008a, p.72), in line with the capacity expansion suggested through our work 
with the CGEN model. 
 
Our modelling suggests that there is potentially a case for investment in further 
”strategic” gas infrastructure beyond that which the market would deliver if we pursue 
the supply-led energy strategy embodied in the Low Carbon scenario as opposed to the 
demand-led strategy embodied in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario. By itself, that 
investment would be relatively modest and would add little to consumer costs. The key 
policy question is whether the benefits of driving this investment through rate of return 
regulation outweigh the disadvantages of driving out investment made on a purely 
market basis. 
7.5 Future research directions 
 
The work described in this report was motivated by increasing public concern about the 
vulnerability of the UK energy system to contingencies that go beyond extreme weather, 
demand variations that can be characterised statistically and “normal” outages of plant.  
 
We are conscious of the fact that the work has only started to open up a new agenda in 
energy research. We are aware of the limitations: 
 
• The main focus has been on the gas system 
 
• The characterisation of energy “shocks” has looked only at the physical aspects - 
we have not addressed wider market outcomes, for example in terms of changes 
to energy spot prices 
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• We have not been able to attach any probabilities to the shocks that we have 
postulated 
 
• We have not considered the vulnerability of the UK economy as a whole to 
fluctuations and/or shocks in world energy prices 
 
In taking work on energy system resilience forwards, we would therefore consider the 
following lines of inquiry: 
 
• Examining a wider range of contingencies relating to oil, electricity and 
renewables (including bio-energy) 
 
• Examining market responses to shocks as well as possible physical responses 
costed in a bottom-up manner 
 
• Attempting to attach probabilities to various types of shock. This may not be 
possible for “geopolitical” events, but many of the historic shocks that we 
reviewed resulted for insurable weather or accident-related incidents for which 
evidence may be available. 
 
• Producing new or “reduced” models of system responses to energy shocks that 
could be operated in Monte-Carlo mode. The current models are too cumbersome 
to operate in this way. 
 
Finally, by focusing on “resilience” as an intrinsic characteristic of the energy system we 
have, broadly, managed to avoid considering the fundamental causes of shocks and 
instabilities. In UKERC Phase II which started in May 2009, we will be assessing the 
development of future international gas markets, the stresses that radical de-
carbonisation objectives place on the international energy system, and the adequacy of 
international governance arrangements for managing stress and change. The MARKAL 
model described in Section 3 is being supplemented by the TIMES global model which 
breaks out the UK as one region in a global market for energy. 
 
67 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
REFERENCES 
 
AGD (Australian Government Attorney-General's Department) (1998) EMA Disasters 
Database. http://www.disasters.ema.gov.au/, visited 24 January 2011. 
Anandarajah, G., Strachan, N., Ekins, P., Kannan, R. & Hughes, N. (2009) Pathways to a 
Low Carbon Economy: Energy Systems Modelling. UK Energy Research Centre Research 
Repprt, http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=198, visited 7 
April 2011. 
Bazilian, M. & Roques, F. (2008) Analytical Methods for Energy Diversity and Security. 
Elsevier. Oxford.  
BBC (2007) Barcelona blackout into third day. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6915728.stm, visited 24 January 2011. 
Berizzi, A. (2004) The Italian 2003 blackout. IEEE Power Engineering Society General 
Meeting 2004, Vol.2, 1673 – 1679.  
BERR (2006) Digest of United Kingdom Energy Statistics. Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, London. 
BERR (2008a), UK Renewable Energy Strategy: Consultation. Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, London. 
BERR (2008b) Microgeneration Strategy Progress Report. Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, London, 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/sources/sustainable/microgeneration/index.h
tml, visited 7 April 2011. 
BERR (2008c) Meeting the Energy Challenge. A White Paper on Nuclear Power, 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, London, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file43006.pdf, 
visited 7 April 2011. 
BreakingNews (2007) Barcelona blackout leaves thousands without power. 
http://www.breakingnews.ie/archives/?c=WORLD&jp=mhcwaucwkfql&d=2007-07-23, 
visited 7 April 2011. 
BWEA (2009), UK Wind Energy Database. British Wind Energy Association, 
http://www.bwea.com/statistics/2008.asp visited 7 April 2011 
Centrica (2006) Interim Report on Rough Incident. http://www.centrica-
sl.co.uk/files/pressrelease/240406_InterimRecoveryReport.pdf, visited 7 April 2011. 
Centrica (2007) Annual Report and Accounts 2006. p6, 
http://www.centrica.co.uk/files/reports/2006ar/files/2006_annual_report.pdf, visited 7 
April 2011. 
68 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Chaudry, M., Jenkins, N. & Strbac, G. (2008) Multi-time period combined gas and 
electricity network optimisation. Electric Power Systems Research, 7 (78), 1265-79. 
CEC (2008) Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU Energy Security and Solidarity 
Action Plan. Commission of the European Communities, COM(2008) 781 final. 
CPNI (2009) Security Planning. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, 
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Security-Planning/, visited 12 April 2011. 
DECC (2008a) Energy Markets Outlook, December 2008. Department of Energy and 
Climate Change /The Stationery Office, London/Norwich. 
DECC (2008b) Updated Energy and Carbon Projections. URN 08/1358, Department of 
Energy and Climate Change, London.  
DECC (2009a) Low Carbon Transition Plan: National strategy for climate and energy. 
Department of Energy and Climate Change, London, 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/lc_uk/lc_trans_plan/lc_trans_plan
.aspx, visited 7 April 2011. 
DECC (2009b) Heat and Energy Saving Strategy Consultation. Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, London, 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/planningandbuilding/heatenergysavingstrat
egy, visited 7 April 2011.  
DECC (2009c) Draft National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power. Department of Energy 
and Climate Change, London. 
DECC (2010) Electricity Market Reform: Consultation Document. Cm 7983, Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, London. 
DEFRA (2007) UK Energy Efficiency Action Plan 2007. Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs, London 
DTI (2003) Energy White Paper: Our Energy Future – Creating a Low-Carbon Economy. 
Cm 5761, February, Department of Trade and Industry /The Stationery Office, 
London/Norwich. 
DTI (2006) Our Energy Challenge: Power from the People. Microgeneration Strategy. 
Department of Trade and Industry, London, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file27575.p
df/, visited 7 April 2011. 
DTI (2007a) Meeting the Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy. Cm 7124, DTI/The 
Stationery Office, London/Norwich. 
DTI (2007b) The Future of Nuclear Power: the Role of Nuclear Power in a Low-Carbon 
Economy. Consultation Document, DTI, London, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/pag
e39704.html, visited 7 April 2011. 
69 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Earth Policy Institute (2009) World Oil Production, 1950-2007. http://www.earth-
policy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2007/update67#table1, visited 7 April 2011. 
EC (2006) Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential. COM(2006)545, 
Communication of 19 October, 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/action_plan_energy_efficiency/doc/com_2006_0545_en.pdf, 
visited 7 April 2011. 
EIA (2006) Electric Power Monthly March 2006. Energy Information Administration, 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/electricity/epm/02260603.pdf, visited 7 April 2011. 
Elkraft System (2003) Power failure in Eastern Denmark and Southern Sweden on 23 
September 2003 - Final report on the course of events. Elkraft System, Denmark. 
ESMAP (2007) Risk Assessment Methods for Power Utility Planning. Special Report 
001/07, The World Bank. 
FERC (2003) Final report on Price manipulation in western markets: fact-finding 
investigation of potential manipulation of electric and natural gas prices. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec.asp, 
visited 7 April 2011. 
Freeman, M. J. (2006) Power Outages Hit U.S. Grid; Utility Deregulation to Blame, 
Executive Intelligence Review. Volume 33, Number 31. 
Global Insight (2005) Estimation of industrial buyers potential demand response to short 
periods of high gas and electricity prices. Global Insight, London.  
Grubb, M., Butler, L. & Twomey, P. (2006) Diversity and security in UK electricity 
generation: the influence of low carbon objectives.  Energy Policy, vol. 34, issue 18, 
pages 4050-4062. 
Helm, D. (2003) Energy, the Market and the State: British Energy Policy since 1979. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
House of Commons (2008) Business and Enterprise - Eleventh Report. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmberr/293/29302.htm, 
visited 7 April 2011. 
HMG (2010) Government Response to the first annual Progress Report of the Committee 
on Climate Change. HM Government, London. 
Holling, C.S. (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics. 4:1-23. 
Holling, C.S. (1996) Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience In. Schulze PC ed. 
Engineering within ecological constraints. National Academy Press, Washington DC. 
IAEA (2001) Wien Automatic System Planning (WASP) Package Version-IV, User's 
Manual. International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria. 
70 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
IEA (2006) Natural Gas Market Review 2006. International Energy Agency, 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/gasmarket2006.pdf, visited 7 April 2011. 
IEA (2007) IEA Response System for Oil Supply Emergencies. International Energy 
Agency, Paris 
IEA (2008a) Energy Technology Perspectives. International Energy Agency, Paris. 
IEA (2008b) Deploying Renewables: Principles for Effective Policies. International Energy 
Agency, Paris. 
ILEX (2006) Strategic storage and other options to ensure long term gas security. ILEX 
(now Pyory). 
IPCC (2001) Climate Change 2001: Working Group II: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Section 1.4.1, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
JESS (2006) Long term Security of Energy Supply. Joint Energy Security of Supply 
group.  
Kannan, R. & Strachan, N. (2009) Modelling the UK residential energy sector under long-
term decarbonisation senarios: comparison between energy systems and sectorial 
modelling approaches. Applied Energy, 86 (4): 416-428. 
Kannan R., Strachan N., Pye S., &  Balta-Ozkan N. (2007) UK MARKAL model 
Documentation. http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-
index.php?page=ES_MARKAL_Documentation_2010, visited 7 April 2011. 
Kariuki, K.K. & Allan, R.N. (1996) Evaluation of reliability worth and value of lost load. 
IEE Proceedings: Generation, Transmission and Distribution, 143(2), pp171-180. 
Koritarov, V et al (2005) A Methodology for the Evaluation of Wind Power Using the 
WASP-IV Computer Model, World Bank  
LNG World News (2010) UK: Reduced LNG Import from Qatar Ups Winter Gas Prices. 
http://www.lngworldnews.com/uk-reduced-lng-import-from-qatar-ups-winter-gas-
prices/, visited 7 April 2011. 
Miliband, E. (2008) The Rise And Fall And Rise Again Of A Department of Energy. Lecture 
at Imperial College 9 December, 
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/pls/portallive/docs/1/54221696.PDF, visited 7 April 2011. 
National Grid (2006) Winter 2006/07 Consultation Document. National Grid. 
National Grid (2008) Winter Consultation Report 2008/9: A review of winter 2007/8 & 
preliminary outlook for winter 2008/9. National Grid, 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/WhlMkts/CustandIndustry/winout2008/Documents1/
Winter%20Outlook%20Consultation%20Report%20%28June%29.pdf, visited 7 April 
2011.  
71 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Northwest Power and Conservation Council (1996) Blackout of 1996. 
http://www.nwcouncil.org/history/Blackout.asp, visited 7 April 2011. 
Ofgem (2003) Summer Interruptions 17 and 18 June 2003: Conclusions. Ofgem, 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/WhlMkts/CompandEff/Archive/4263-
Summer_interruptions_conclusions_Aug03.pdf, visited 7 April 2011. 
Ofgem (2004) The review of top up arrangements in gas: Conclusions document. Ofgem, 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?file=The%20Review%20of%20T
op%20Up%20Arrangements%20in%20Gas%20-
%20Conclusions%20Document.pdf&refer=Networks/ad, visited 7 April 2011. 
Ofgem (2009) Project discovery energy market scenarios. Ofgem, London. 
Oren, S. (2000) Capacity Payments and Supply Adequacy in Competitive Electricity 
Markets, VII Symposium of Specialists in Electric Operational and Expansion Planning. 
Curitiba, 
www.pserc.wisc.edu/ecow/get/publicatio/2000public/oren_capacity_payment.pdf, visited 
7 April 2011. 
OXERA (2007) An assessment of the potential measures to improve gas security of 
supply. OXERA. 
REBIS (2004) REBIS: GIS Volume 3: Generation and Transmission main report. The 
European Union’s CARDS programme for the BALKAN region. 
Redpoint (2010) Electricity Market Reform: Analysis of policy options. Redpoint Energy, 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/emr/1043-emr-analysis-policy-
options.pdf, visited 7 April 2011. 
Reuters (2007) UPDATE 3-UK's CATS gas pipe reopens after repairs. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL3058280220070830?sp=true, visited 7 April 2011. 
Reuters (2011) Norway's Kollsnes gas plant returns to near capacity. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUKOSN00491820110106, visited 7 April 2011. 
Skea, J. & Ekins, P. (Eds.) (2009) UK Energy 2050: Making the transition to a secure and 
low-carbon energy system: synthesis report. UKERC, 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/Downloads/PDF/U/UKERCEnergy2050/0906UKERC2050.pdf, 
visited 7 April 2011 
Skea, J., Ekins, P., & Winskel, M. (Eds.) (2011) Energy 2050: Making the Transition to a 
Secure Low-Carbon Energy System. Earthscan, London, ISBN 9781849710848. 
Smekens, K. (2004) Response from a MARKAL technology model to the EMF scenario 
assumptions. Energy Economics; 26, 655-674. 
Sorrell, S., O’Malley, E., Schleich, S. & Scott, S. (Eds.) (2004) The Economics of Energy 
Efficiency. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham/Northampton MA. 
72 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Stern, J. (2004) UK gas security: time to get serious. Energy Policy, 32 (17), pp 1967-
1979. 
Stirling, A. (2009a) What is Energy Security? uncertainties, dynamics, strategies, 
Presentation to Sussex Energy Group Seminar UK energy security: What do we know, 
and what should be done? Coin Street Neighbourhood Centre, South Bank, London, 27th 
January.  
Stirling, A. (2009b) Risk, Uncertainty and Power. Seminar, 597, 33-39, May 2009.  
Strachan, N., Kannan, R. & Pye, S. (2008) Scenarios and Sensitivities on Long-term UK 
Carbon Reductions using the UK MARKAL and MARKAL-Macro Energy System Models. 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/, visited 7 April 2011 
Strachan, N. & Kannan, R. (2008) Hybrid modelling of long-term carbon reduction 
scenarios for the UK. Energy Economics; 30(6): 2947-2963.  
U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force (2004) Final Report on the August 14, 
2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations. 
https://reports.energy.gov/, visited 7 April 2011. 
van der Welle, A.J. & van der Zwaan, B.C.C. (2007) An Overview of Selected Studies on 
the Value of Lost Load (VOLL). In National and EU level estimates of energy securities, 
CASES EU FP-VI project, Work Package 5 report D5.1. 
Vournas, C (2004) Technical Summary on the Athens and Southern Greece Blackout of 
July 12, 2004. 
Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S. R. & Kinzig, A. (2004) Resilience, adaptability 
and transformability in social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 9(2):5. 
Walker, B. & Salt, D. (2006) Resilience Thinking: Sustaining ecosystems and people in a 
changing world. Island Press, Washington, D.C., USA. 
Wicks, M. (2009) Energy Security: A national challenge in a changing world. Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, London. 
Winskel, M., Markusson, N., Moran, B., Jeffrey, H., Anandarajah, G., Hughes, N., 
Candelise, C., Clarke, D., Taylor, G., Chalmers, H., Dutton, G., Howarth, P., Jablonski, 
S., Kalyvas, C., & Ward, D (2009) Decarbonising the UK Energy System: Accelerated 
Development of Low Carbon Energy Supply Technologies. UKERC Report UKERC Energy 
2050 Research Report 1, UKERC.  
World Energy Council (2003) Blackouts: Southern Sweden and Denmark, 23 September, 
2003. http://www.worldenergy.org/focus/blackouts/391.asp, visited 7 April 2011. 
73 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
ANNEX A: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RESILIENCE 
INDICATORS 
 
This Annex describes in more depth the analysis underpinning the quantification of the 
Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient scenarios. It is divided into three main sections: 1) 
the rationale for the final demand constraint; 2) parametric analysis using MARKAL-MED 
which explores the interaction between the final energy demand and supply diversity 
constraints; and 3) the assignment of reliability indicators used in the electricity 
modelling in Section 5. 
A.1 Final energy demand  
 
An appropriate constraint on final energy demand needs to be ambitious while at the 
same time lying within the bounds of technical and economic feasibility. We have 
approached this from two angles. First, we conducted sensitivity tests on the MARKAL 
model constraining final energy demand to fall at increasingly large annual percentage 
rates with respect to GDP. This tested feasibility from the modelling perspective. Then 
we looked at the range of uncertainty associated with the delivery of energy efficiency 
embodied in the UK’s Energy Efficiency Action Plan (DEFRA, 2007), as subsequently 
updated and quantified in the most recent DECC Updated Energy and Carbon projections 
(DECC, 2008b) available at the time the work was conducted.  
 
The DECC projections and the sensitivity tests can be compared out to 2020. We have 
taken one of the MARKAL sensitivity tests which closely matches the DECC “optimistic” 
projection of the delivery of energy efficiency policies. The associated annual percentage 
improvements in energy efficiency (ratio of final energy demand to GDP) are then 
extrapolated out to 2050.  
 
Table A-1 compares the development of final energy demand and GDP in the UKERC 
Reference scenario and under four other assumptions (Sensitivities A-D) about the 
development of the final energy demand/GDP ratio beyond 2010. The ratio is assumed 
to improve at rates between 2.4% and 3.6% per annum. The lower rate is slightly faster 
than in the UKERC Reference scenario. Option D (3.6% per annum) could not be solved 
in MARKAL and we have therefore assessed sensitivities B and C in more depth. 
 
Sensitivities B and C are compared with the most recent official UK energy projections 
coupled with projections of the impacts of UK energy efficiency policy actions. The 
Updated Energy and Carbon Emissions Projections (DECC, 2008b) include a scenario out 
to 2020 which includes “firm and funded” policies in the 2007 Energy White Paper, those 
announced in the White Paper and included in the 2007 Energy Efficiency Action Plan 
(DEFRA, 2007) plus two further measures announced since the Energy Efficiency Action 
Plan was published.13 Three separate estimates of the effectiveness of the post-White 
Paper policies were made – low, central and high. 
 
                                                 
13 “Carbon neutral government” and the inclusion of domestic aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. 
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Table A-1: Projected GDP, Final Energy demand and energy intensity  
Year 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
GDP index 100.0 112.9 129.3 143.5 158.4 174.9 193.1 213.2 235.4 259.9 286.9 
PJ                       
REF 6189 6321 6300 6260 6288 6287 6312 6367 6401 6441 6455 
A 6189 6318 6291 6182 6045 5910 5779 5651 5525 5403 5283 
B 6189 6318 6291 6056 5801 5557 5323 5099 4885 4679 4483 
C 6189 6318 6291 5933 5567 5224 4902 4600 4316 4051 3801 
D 6189 6318 6291 5811 5341 4909 4512 4148 3812 3504 3221 
% pa                       
REF/GDP  -1.99% -2.74% -2.18% -1.87% -1.96% -1.88% -1.79% -1.86% -1.84% -1.92% 
A  -1.99% -2.76% -2.40% -2.40% -2.40% -2.40% -2.40% -2.40% -2.40% -2.40% 
B  -1.99% -2.76% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80% -2.80% 
C  -1.99% -2.76% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% -3.20% 
D   -1.99% -2.76% -3.60% -3.60% -3.60% -3.60% -3.60% -3.60% -3.60% -3.60% 
 
 
Table A-2 summarises the impact of the measures as estimated by DECC in mtCO2 
equivalent. These have been converted to final energy demand figures using sector 
specific ratios derived by DEFRA (2007). 
 
Table A-2: Assumed Impact of Energy Efficiency Policies 
 DECC mtCO2 DECC PJ 
 Lo Central High Lo Central High 
Carbon Reduction Commitment 3.6 3.6 3.6 38 38 38 
Products policy 2.2 4.0 6.2 24 43 67 
EPBD 1.4 2.2 3.6 19 29 48 
Carbon neutral government  0.7 0.7 0.7 7 7 7 
Smart Metering 0.4 0.7 0.7 5 9 9 
Total business and public 8.3 11.2 14.8 93 127 169 
Further improvements in 
vehicle efficiency 
0.3 6.2 12.0 4 87 168 
Domestic aviation included in 
EU ETS 
0.7 1.1 1.5 9 15 20 
Total transport 1.0 7.3 13.5 13 101 188 
Better billing and metering - 0.8 2.2 - 11 31 
Product policy 1.5 3.3 4.8 16 35 51 
Supplier obligation 11.0 12.8 14.7 155 180 207 
DCLG- Zero carbon homes 4.0 4.4 4.4 74 81 81 
Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive 
0.7 1.5 2.2 12 25 36 
Total residential 17.2 22.8 28.3 257 333 408 
TOTAL DEMAND SIDE 26.5 41.3 56.6 363 562 765 
Based on: DEFRA (2007); DECC (2008b) 
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Figure A-1 then compares final energy demand in 2005 with DECC’s central estimates of 
final energy demand in 2020. Figure A-1 includes columns referring to the low and high 
estimates of policy effectiveness, a “reference” case which backs out all post-White 
Paper policies and a “no policies” case. The “reference” case is relevant because the 
assumptions underlying it correspond to those underlying the UKERC Reference scenario. 
Finally, Figure A-2 compares the DECC final energy demand projections from Figure A-1 
with those arising from UKERC sensitivities B and C as set out in Table A-2. There is a 
slight discrepancy between actual final energy demand in 2005 and that projected in the 
MARKAL Reference scenario (which starts from a year 2000 baseline) which needs to be 
taken into account. Allowing for this final energy demand, UKERC sensitivity C is almost 
identical to the DECC high impacts projection. We therefore set the final demand 
constraints in the UKERC Resilience scenario equal to those in sensitivity case C. This is 
equivalent to saying that ambitious policies, with a relatively high impact, are 
implemented through to 2020 and that the momentum of energy efficiency policy is 
maintained afterwards. 
 
 
Figure A-1: Projections of Final Energy Demand after Allowing for Energy 
Saving 
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Figure A-2: Comparison of DECC Projections and UKERC Sensitivities 
 
 
 
A.2 Resilient parametric analyses in MED  
 
Definition of constraints  
 
In this section, parametric constraints on diversity in primary energy supply and power 
supply, and reduction in final energy demand, are defined and analysed using the 
MARKAL-MED model. The parametric constraints and their rationale are given in Table A-
3. Each constraint is applied in isolation. Insights from the analyses are summarised in 
the following sub sections. The results from the parametric runs are interpreted with 
respect to the Reference scenario (Anandarajah et al. 2009).
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Table A-3: List of constraints in parametric analyses in MED 
Criteria Rationale Name and description of constraints 
Diversity in 
primary 
energy 
supply 
This criterion is intended 
to promote supply 
diversity in overall energy 
system. 
R_PE A maximum market share of 40%1 is applied 2 to each fuel type. 
Import and domestic fuels are aggregated as a single category. 
Uranium for nuclear power generation is excluded in this constraint but 
nuclear generation is constraint through diversity in power supply. 
Diversity in 
power 
sector 
This criterion is intended 
to promote supply 
diversity specifically for 
the electricity sector. 
R_P (PJ): Diversity 
in electricity 
generation mix  
A maximum market share of 40% is applied2 to electricity generation 
from each fuel sources. In general, fuel sources are aggregated as coal 
3, gas 3, nuclear 4 and renewable 5. 
R_P (GW): 
Diversity in 
installed capacity 
Similar to the diversity of electricity generation mix constraint R_P 
(PJ), but applied to installed capacity. 
R_POW: Diversity 
in both installed 
capacity and 
generation mix 
Combination of the above two constraints, R_P (PJ) and R_P (GW)  
Reduction 
of final 
energy 
demand  
This criterion is intended 
as proxy for expenditure 
on final energy that would 
reduce the UK’s economic 
exposure to volatility or 
enduring rises in global 
energy prices.  
This final energy intensity constraint is aimed to reduce the final energy demand. The final 
energy intensity is unconstrained 2 up to 2010 and then falls 6 at the following annual rates. 
R_FE-A 2.4% per annum 
R_FE-B 2.8% per annum 
R_FE-C 3.2% per annum 
R_FE-D 3.6% per annum.  
1 The 40% threshold is derived from an equivalent Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 30%. HHI is used by the Office of Fair Trading to measure excessive 
concentration when considering mergers and acquisitions 
2 Due to the existing capital stocks and near term policy constraints, all the above constraints are implemented from 2015 
3 Coal/gas with and without CCS is aggregated 
4 only to new build nuclear plants 
5 offshore wind, tides, marine and wave 
6 In the reference scenario (REF), energy intensity reduces between 1.79% and 2.74% per annum during 2010-2050 (Anandarajah et al., 2009). 
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Diversity in primary energy supply 
 
In the Reference scenario, gas dominates the primary fuel supply in 2025 and coal in 
2050. The R_PE constraint bites from 2015 because of the oil market share and from 
2030 because of the coal market share.  However, there is no significant change to the 
energy system in 2025. In 2050, primary energy supply reduces to 7751 PJ versus 8243 
PJ in the Reference scenario. The share of coal in primary energy supply reduces to 31% 
(vs. 39% in the Reference scenario). The reduction in coal is because of change in the 
power section. Coal based electricity generation reduces to 57% from 81% in the 
Reference scenario. In turn, nuclear based power generation fills the electricity gap and 
contributes 18% of the total electricity generation (vs. no nuclear in the reference 
scenario). It illustrates that the power sector is the cheapest sector to enhance diversity 
in primary energy supply. The high cost nuclear electricity (with respect to the cheaper 
coal) induces demand side response, particularly in electricity driven appliances in the 
residential and service sectors. The restriction of coal also reduces direct use of coal in 
industrial applications. These demand side responses reduce final energy demand, and 
thereby primary energy supply. The welfare cost is about £3.5 billion in 2050. The 
diversity in fuel supply, particularly driven by the power sector, reduces the CO2 
emission by 26% in 2050 from the reference scenario or 16% from the 1990 level.  
 
Figure A-3: Primary energy supply in parametric runs 
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Diversity in power supply: electricity generation mix 
 
Figure A-4 shows power generation mix in 2025 and 2050. In the Reference scenario, 
coal dominates the electricity generation mix with 54% share in 2025 and 81% share in 
2050. As the result of the R-P(PJ) constraint, coal based power generation in 2025 
reduces to 40%. The gas share increases to 31% (vs. 19% in the Reference scenario). 
In 2050, the nuclear share rises to 33% (vs. zero in the Reference scenario). 
Diversifying electricity generation from coal to nuclear increases the cost of the energy 
system, and also induces demand reduction. For example, the residential electricity 
demand for appliances reduces by 5% in 2025.  The combination of high energy system 
cost and the losses in consumer surplus results in a welfare loss of about £1.1bn in 2025 
rising to £4bn in 2050. At the same time the diversification of electricity generation 
reduces CO2 emissions by 22% from the 1990 level.  
 
Diversity in power supply: installed capacity 
 
The capacity constraint encourages investment in gas capacity in the short term because 
it is cheapest after coal, the unconstrained choice. Nuclear and wind benefit in the long 
term. In 2025, the installed capacity of gas plants doubles whereas generation increases 
by less than 50% (A-5). As coal based generation is cheapest, the investment in gas 
plant is simply to increase capacity diversity.   
 
In 2050, the coal based generation capacity in R_P(GW) reduces to two-thirds of the 
level in the Reference scenario. It stimulates new investment in nuclear for base load 
generation. The model also chooses high wind capacity, which requires additional gas 
plant to cope with its intermittence nature. Thus, the investment in cheaper gas plant 
complements the intermittent wind capacity and also serves as reserve margin in 
addition to fulfilling the diversity constraints.  Despite the diversity in capacity, electricity 
generation is still dominated by coal (60%).  Therefore the demand side response is 
lower than in the R_P(PJ) run. The welfare costs are £0.8bn in 2025 and £2.5bn in 2050. 
 
Applying the R_P(GW) constraint results in more coal based electricity generation (60%) 
and therefore it does not meet the criterion for diversity in generation.  On the other 
hand, the R_P(PJ) run fulfils the criteria for capacity diversity. Combining the two 
constraints produces more or less a similar results to R_P(GW) in the short term and 
R_P(GJ) in the long term.  Therefore its welfare cost in 2025 is slightly higher than in 
R_P(PJ). However, the CO2 emission reduction and welfare cost are similar to those in 
the R_P(PJ) run (see Table A-4). 
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Figure A-4: Electricity generation mix (in parametric runs) 
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Figure A-5: Installed capacity (in parametric runs)  
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Figure A-6: Final energy demand in parametric runs  
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Reduction of final energy 
 
Figure A-6 shows final energy demand from the parametric runs. The final energy 
reduction constraints bite harder than the diversity constraints. An annual energy 
intensity reduction of 3.6% (R_FE-D) gives an infeasible solution. All end use sectors 
respond to the final energy constraint through energy efficiency improvements and fuel 
switching. In general, this constraint shifts the final energy mix from gas towards 
electricity. For example, gas based heating in the residential sector is replaced by heat 
pumps. By itself, this would lead to increased electricity demand. However, this is more 
than compensated by reductions in electricity demand for other purposes. Reducing final 
energy demand also reduces primary energy demand, which now coal dominates. 
Although coal dominates electricity generation, CO2 emissions fall by 40% from the 1990 
level.  
 
There is a substantial demand side response in the residential sector. This declines by 
25% in 2025 and 47% in 2050 (Figure A-7). The high level of demand reduction results 
in very high welfare losses of £6-18bn in 2025 and £10-45bn in 2050 (Table A-4). 
  
Figure A-7: Demand reduction in residential sector (in parametric runs)  
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R_PE R_P (PJ) R_P (GW) R_POW R_FE-A R_FE-B R_FE-C 
(in £ billion) 
Change in energy system cost +2.52 +3.68 +2.18 3.77 -4.84 -7.74 -13.70 
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Res idential demand reductions   in 2050 
‐60%
‐50%
‐40%
‐30%
‐20%
‐10%
0%
10%
R
E
F
R
_P
E
R
_P
 (
P
J)
R
_P
 (
G
W
)
R
_P
O
W
R
_F
E
‐A
R
_F
E
‐B
R
_F
E
‐C
C
ha
ng
e 
fr
om
 t
he
 r
ef
er
en
ce
R es idential  ‐ E lec tric ity
R es idential  ‐ Gas
R es idential  ‐ Heating
R es idential  ‐ Hot‐water
84 
UK Energy Research Centre                                               UKERC/RR/HQ/2011/001 
Characterising the resilient core scenario 
 
From the above parametric analyses, it is clear that none of the individual constraints 
fulfils all the criteria for the resilient energy system set out in Table A-3.  Under the 
power supply diversity constraint R_P(PJ), the share of gas in primary energy supply in 
2025 is 43%, exceeding the 40% limit on market share. In the primary energy diversity 
constraint run R_PE, the share of coal based electricity generation (>57%) exceeds the 
threshold level of 40%. In neither of these runs, does final energy demand fall at more 
than 3.2% per annum. Conversely, in R_FE-C run, neither power supply nor primary 
energy supply diversify. Therefore all three constraints, diversity in primary energy 
supply (R_PE), diversity in power generation mix (R_P (PJ)) and a reduction in final 
energy intensity of 3.2% per annum (R_FE-C) have been combined for the core resilient 
scenario.  
 
In the Low Carbon scenario, residential heating switches entirely to heat pumps. This 
also happens in the R_FE-C run. To ensure diversity, an additional constraint is imposed 
in the Resilient scenario so that only a maximum of 30% of residential heating demand 
can be met by heat pumps. 
 
A.3 Electricity System Reliability14  
 
This section addresses the treatment of reliability in the WASP model described in 
Section 3. 
 
The main objective of electric system planning is to adequately meet demand for electric 
power at the minimum cost within the broader energy and its related policy targets. The 
amount of generation capacity in a power system is considered to be “adequate” if it 
meets electricity demand with an “economically efficient” level of reliability. Conceptually 
this “optimal” level of capacity to be installed would be determined by balancing 
generation investment costs against benefits associated with the improvements in 
reliability of supply, i.e. the reduction in loss of supply to consumers. Instead of 
conducting such a cost benefit analysis, generation system planners traditionally aim to 
maintain a certain level of reserve (capacity) margin that would deliver a minimum 
reliability performance as measured by various reliability indices. 
 
Factors that affect the long-term reliability of the generation system include: 
 
• Random breakdown of generating equipment (forced outages) 
• Variation in demand to be met by generating system (including random 
variations) 
• Variation in available energy from energy limited generation sources (e.g., wind 
and hydro power) which also affects the available capacity to the system 
• Scheduled maintenance of generating units which increases with plant aging  
• Decommissioning or de-rating of plants  
• Changes in new capacity scheduled to come online, e.g., delays or cancellations 
because of financial and other constraints.  
 
                                                 
14  This discussion applies to the WASP model. A similar approach was used in CGEN.  
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A number of system reliability evaluation measures are being used or have been 
proposed. Such indices may apply to the entire power system, from generation through 
transmission to distribution. The reliability indices discussed in this Annex are with 
reference to generation system reliability only and exclude transmission and distribution. 
The most common indices include reserve margin, Loss of load probability, loss of load 
expectation and expected energy not served. Others include loss of energy probability, 
frequency and duration of failures, effective load carrying capability and firm equivalent 
capacity. It should be noted that the popularity of an index is not necessarily due to it 
providing an accurate assessment of system reliability. Rather it could be due to the 
ease of its use and required magnitude of input/data for its assessment. Some indices 
are mutually convertible or one can be approximated from the other. 
 
In a centrally planned system dominated by thermal generation technologies, the most 
frequently used index has been the “Loss of Load Probability” (LOLP) which specifies the 
probability that the system peak demand will not be met. The last security standard 
applied in the UK, by the Central Electricity Generation Board ahead of privatisation in 
1990, required that the risk of peak demand exceeding available supply (LOLP) was not 
to exceed 0.09 (i.e., interruptions in supply should not occur in more than nine winters 
in a century). Based on the probabilities of plant failure, including uncertainty in the 
timely development of generation that corresponded to an equivalent generation 
availability of 85%, this standard would require a capacity margin of approximately 
20%.  
 
The North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) reports a use of LOLP, LOLE 
and reserve margin measures to evaluate the adequacy of their regional generation 
capacity portfolios. Many of the regional reliability councils (regions) in NERC’s 
jurisdiction apply either LOLP (1 in ten years) or LOLE (0.1 day/year or 2.4 hour/year).15 
In Australia, the reliability standard for generation and bulk supply is expressed in terms 
of the maximum permissible unserved energy or the maximum allowable level of 
electricity at risk of not being supplied to consumers. This is set at 0.002% of the annual 
energy consumption for the associated region or regions per financial year.16 
 
It is important to recognise that each index has certain strengths and weaknesses and 
does not provide a complete description of generating system reliability. A strategic 
study of system development should quantify system reliability using more than one 
measure. The WASP model was used in this study to assess the electricity generation 
system's reliability and security of supply level in terms of the following three indicators: 
  
• Loss-of-Load Probability (LOLE): the percentage of time during which the system 
load exceeds the available generating capacity in the system 
 
• Energy not Served (ENS): the amount of energy required by the system and 
which cannot be supplied by the generating capacity existing in the system 
 
 
                                                 
15  Resource and Transmission Adequacy Recommendations, North American Electric Reliability Council 
(NERC), 2004 
16  Comprehensive Reliability Review, AEMC Reliability Panel. Australian Energy Market Commission, 2007 
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• Capacity (Reserve) Margin (CM): is the amount of generation capacity in the 
system in excess of the annual peak load.  
 
The three reliability indices encompass technical constraints referring to the minimum 
acceptable level of generating system performance and an economic criterion (ENS 
coupled with a value assigned to energy not served) to include the generating system 
reliability considerations directly in the determination of minimum overall costs. System 
reliability indices, LOLE and ENS, are computed for each system expansion configuration 
that has an overall generating capacity within user-specified reserve margin constraints. 
These are calculated in the model during the probabilistic simulation of system operation 
for each configuration. The simulation model applies a stochastic model for treating 
individual unit’s availability to model their forced outages. Maintenance schedules and 
any limitations in the availability of wind and hydro energy are also accounted for.  
 
We have applied the LOLE reliability standard as 0.05% of the year to determine 
adequate capacity level in the system. This is equivalent to LOLE = 4 hours/year 
(0.05x8760/100 = 4.38 hours/year).17 Similar standards are exercised in other power 
systems such as France (LOLE: 3 hours/year)18 and Republic of Ireland (LOLE: 8 
hours/year).19 No direct constraint is applied on the amount of energy not served. This is 
reflected in the trade-off between reliability costs and other system costs. If an 
expansion plan contains system configurations for which the annual energy demand is 
greater than the expected annual generation from all units for the corresponding year, 
the total costs of the plan is penalized by the resulting cost of the energy-not-served 
(£5/kWh of energy not served).  
 
Considering the variation in characteristics of the diverse technologies modelled in this 
study, a wide range of reserve margin constraints - 15% to 50% - were initially applied 
for each scenario. The purpose of restricting the range of reserve margins is to limit the 
number of possible configurations (combinations) of various technologies over the study 
period. This approach results in saving some processing time with the computationally 
intensive WASP model. However, the model flags up cases where the optimal solution is 
likely to exist outside the set reserve margin range, or if the target LOLE level may not 
achievable. In such cases the range was further expanded to allow further capacity 
augmentation in order to obtain a (least) cost optimal generation plan meeting the 
required reliability levels. 
 
A system with low reliability is likely to be a long term concern. This may be the 
symptom of a fundamental problem – a lack of sufficient supply capacity – which will 
take time to rectify due to long lead times involved in building new capacity. All 
electricity generation systems are designed to be reliable in terms of one or more of the 
criteria specified above. However, these criteria exclude events (including exogenous 
incidents) such as industrial action, terrorism and large scale interruptions of primary 
energy for geopolitical reasons. These events, although less frequent to date, are getting 
increasing attention due to the serious potential impacts on supply security. From the 
consumer’s perspective, however, there usually appears to be little if any difference 
between an interruption caused by an inadequate capacity condition (reliability issue) 
                                                 
17  Modern Power System Planning, X. Wang, J.R. McDonald, McGraw Hill, 1994 
18  Generation Adequacy Report on the electricity supply-demand balance in France, RTE 2007 
19  Generation Adequacy Report, Republic of Ireland, EirGrid 2007  
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and one caused by an event outside the traditional reliability domain. However, from a 
system development perspective, the two causes have very different ramifications.  
 
Reliable generation systems such as those described in Section 5 identified  by running 
the WASP model, will be inherently less vulnerable to any cause of supply interruption. 
However they may not be able to manage exceptional high impact events. A resilient 
energy system as defined in Section 4 may be able to tolerate both, with minimal impact 
on consumers and system costs.  
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ANNEX B: THE RESILIENT SCENARIOS IN DETAIL  
 
This section describes in detail the results of the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient 
scenarios. The Reference and Low Carbon scenarios are described in detail in 
Anandarajah et al. (2009). The two resilient scenarios are compared systematically with 
the other core scenarios. The discussion is grouped round themes: primary energy 
demand; final energy demand; electricity supply; CO2 emissions; marginal CO2 
abatement costs; and demand reduction and welfare costs. However, the discussion also 
flags important cross-sectoral linkages reflected in overall system change. 
B.1 Primary energy demand  
 
Figure B-1 compares primary energy demand in the core scenarios. In the Resilient 
scenario, there is a steep reduction in primary energy demand driven by the constraint 
on final energy demand. Compared to the Reference scenario, primary energy demand is 
14% lower in 2025 and 42% lower in 2050. This reduction is achieved by a combination 
of fuel-switching and energy efficiency improvements both on the supply and demand 
sides.  
 
In 2025, coal demand is 23% lower, gas 13% lower and oil 10% lower (Figure B-2). The 
reduced coal demand is because of a switch from coal to gas in the power sector. 
However, overall gas demand is down because the residential sector uses 33% less gas. 
The reduction in residential gas demand is driven by a switch from gas-fired central 
heating to heat pumps, and price induced demand reduction - the latter is very 
substantial.  Since both coal and gas demand fall, oil demand has to decline to meet the 
supply diversity constraint. It thereby induces changes in the transport sector.  
 
In 2050, coal dominates primary energy supply in the Reference scenario with a market 
share of 38%. In the Resilient scenario coal’s share declines to 28% and gas has the 
largest share with 31%. The change in the primary fuel mix is driven mainly by a switch 
from coal to nuclear in the power sector in order to meet the diversity constraint. 
Biomass supply is 8% higher in the Resilient scenario and meets 6% of primary energy 
demand, compared to 3% in the Reference scenario. However, renewable electricity is 
8% lower, which only just meets the renewable obligation in the power sector. Instead, 
imported electricity is almost three times the level in the Reference scenario.  
 
The pattern of the primary energy demand in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario is similar 
to that in the Resilient scenario (Figure B-2). In 2025, demand is 14% lower than in the 
Low Carbon scenario. In terms of its fuel mix, gas demand is 16% lower but coal 
demand is 35% higher. The decline in gas demand is required to meet the supply 
diversity constraint as the market share of gas in the Low Carbon scenario is over 44%.  
 
Primary energy demand in 2050 is down on the Low Carbon scenario. Coal demand falls 
by 65%. Its market share declines to 14% in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario from 
32% in the Low Carbon scenario. The reduction is coal demand is primarily in the 
industrial and power sectors. In the power sector, generation from coal CCS shrinks by 
65%. The share of oil (mainly for transport fuel) in primary energy demand doubles, 
although in absolute terms it declines by 23%. This is because the transport sector 
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deploys hybrid vehicles rather than ethanol and plug-in hybrid vehicles in the Low 
Carbon scenario. This results in a relatively low use of bioenergy. The combination of 
supply diversity, demand reduction and the shift in technology pathways significantly 
alters the decarbonisation pathway.  
 
Figure B-1: Trend in primary energy supply in the core scenarios 
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Figure B-2: Primary energy supply in core scenarios 
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B.2 Final energy demand 
 
General Picture 
 
Final energy demand in the Resilient scenario is 17% lower than in the Reference 
scenario in 2025 (Figure B-3). Demand falls across all end use sectors, but the decline is 
most significant in the residential and industrial sectors.  The reduction in gas demand 
for residential heating enables the power sector to switch from coal to gas. The demand 
response from the industrial sector reduces coal demand by 26% from the Reference 
scenario. In 2050, final energy demand is 41% lower than in the Reference scenario. 
 
Figure B-4 shows final energy demand by sector. Final energy demand in 2025 is lower 
in the  Resilient scenario in all end use sectors (residential is 27%, industry and service 
sectors 17%, and transport 7% lower than the Reference scenario in 2025).  The lower 
reduction (7%) in the transport sector is because of the availability of a wide range of 
alternative fuel and vehicle technologies (e.g. hydrogen, ethanol, hybrid and plug-in 
hybrid). There are more limited opportunities for fuel switching in other end sectors. 
 
In the Low Carbon Resilient scenario, final energy demand in 2025 is 14% lower than in 
the Low Carbon scenario, and 16% below the 2000 level. The reduction in residential 
energy demand is substantial (23%), and is partly delivered by fuel switching (from gas-
fired central heating to heat pumps). This enables a large reduction of gas use in the 
energy system (25%) and thereby lower CO2 emission. These low CO2 emissions allow 
other sectors to use more carbon intensive fuels. For example, electricity generation 
from coal (without CCS) contributes 23% of total electricity generation in the Low 
Carbon Resilient scenario whereas the Low Carbon scenario has coal only with CCS.  
 
In 2050, final energy demand in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario is 15% lower than in 
the Low Carbon scenario, and 40% below the 2000 level. Unlike in the Low Carbon 
scenario, the residential sector continues to use gas because heat pumps are constrained 
from taking 100% market share. Therefore, gas demand in the residential sector 
accounts for about 10% of final energy demand whereas there is no residential gas in 
the Low Carbon scenario. Since residential energy demand is higher than in the Low 
Carbon scenario (due to the restriction on heat pumps), the model struggle to meet the 
final energy constraint. In response, the power sector decarbonises to a greater extent 
than in the Low Carbon scenario.  
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Figure B-3: Final energy demand in core scenarios by fuel type 
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Figure B-4: Final energy demands in core scenarios by sectors 
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Reference scenario, transport demand declines by less than 6%.  There are no significant 
changes in vehicle technology or in the fuel mix. 
 
By 2050, transport fuel demand almost halves in the Resilient scenario with respect to 
the Reference scenario (Figure B-5). This is largely induced by higher prices (Figure B-
6). However, electricity demand more than doubles because car fleets moves from the 
conventional ICE to plug-in hybrid vehicles (Figure B-7). This change in car fleet also 
reduces the demand for biofuels, which remains constrained however by the renewable 
transport fuel obligation (RTFO). The reduction in electricity demand in other end use 
sectors exceeds the incremental electricity demand from the transport sector, and 
therefore total electricity demand declines by 20%.  
 
Figure B-5: Transport fuel demand in core scenarios (2050) 
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tries to reduce final energy demand in transport using efficient vehicle but there is 
insufficient decarbonisation to meet the 80% target. This drives the power sector to 
decarbonise drastically.  
 
Figure B-6: Demand price response in transport sector (2050) 
 
 
Figure B-7 Car fleets in core scenarios (2050)  
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deployment of heat pumps using decarbonised electricity (Figure B-9). However, in the 
resilient scenarios, heat pumps are prevented from achieving 100% market share. In 
this case, the sector continues to use gas. Consequently, the level of demand reduction 
in the residential sector is far higher in the resilience scenarios than in the Low Carbon 
scenario.  
 
Figure B-8: Residential energy system in core scenarios (2050)  
 
 
Figure B-9: Residential heating in core scenarios by fuel (2050)  
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B.3 Electricity supply 
 
Electricity demand in the Resilient scenario is 11% lower in 2025 and 19% lower in 2050 
than in the Reference scenario (Figure B-10). In 2025, the biggest reduction in electricity 
demand is from the industrial sector (17%) followed by the service (12%) and 
residential (8%) sectors. The reduction in electricity demand is primarily driven by a 
price-induced demand response. In 2050, electricity demand declines across most end 
use sectors but doubles in the transport sector due to the high penetration of plug-in 
hybrid cars. Electricity demand in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario in 2025 is 14% 
lower than in the Low Carbon scenario.   
 
Figure B-11 shows the electricity generation mix in the core scenarios. In 2025, the coal 
dominated power sector in the Reference scenario moves towards gas in the Resilient 
scenario. Coal generation declines by 34% and gas generation almost doubles. However, 
the reduction of gas demand in  the end use sectors exceeds the higher demand from 
the power sector and the net result is lower gas use.  
 
In the Low Carbon Resilient scenario, lower demand reduces electricity generation from 
gas, nuclear, renewable, and imported electricity. Nuclear generation declines by almost 
one-third, while coal’s share increases to 23% from zero in the Low Carbon scenario 
(Figure B-11).  The uptake of coal generation is driven by the power supply diversity 
constraint. At the same time, the additional CO2 emissions from coal based generation 
are offset by lower CO2 emission from end use sectors due to demand reduction.  
In 2050, the power sector diversifies from coal to nuclear as we move from the 
Reference to the Resilient scenario. Coal’s market share declines to 40% from 81%, 
while nuclear generation contributes 23% compared to zero in the Reference scenario. 
This diversification of the power sector substantially contributes to the diversification of 
overall primary energy supply. Although total electricity generation declines by 19%, 
renewable electricity declines by only 8%. Wind generation stays at the same level as in 
the Reference scenario but hydro generation declines to one-third. Imported electricity 
increases and contributes 8% to total electricity supply compared to 2% in the Reference 
case.  
 
Moving from the Low Carbon to the Low Carbon Resilience scenario in 2050, the power 
sector decarbonises radically. This is achieved partly via low electricity demand (down 
26%) and through the deployment of a combination of nuclear, renewable (wind in 
particular), and coal with CCS. The market share of nuclear increases to about 40%. 
Compared to the Low Carbon scenario, wind generation almost doubles and accounts for 
23% of the generation mix. Total renewable electricity generation increases by 117% 
from the Low Carbon scenario. However, coal CCS generation falls by two thirds and its 
market share is only 20% compared to 40% in the Low Carbon scenario. This shift from 
coal CCS to renewables is mainly because the system cannot accommodate residual 
emissions from the CCS.  
 
Figure B-12 shows installed capacity in the core scenarios. In 2025, coal capacity in the 
Resilient scenario is 19GW compared to 29GW in the Reference scenario. Gas capacity 
increases to 23 GW compared to 18 GW in the Reference scenario. In 2050, 50 GW coal 
capacity in the Reference scenario falls to 21 GW in the Resilient scenario while nuclear 
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capacity reaches 12 GW.  There is no significant change in renewables capacity, but 
interconnector capacity increases to 6 GW from 3 GW in the Reference scenario. 
 
In the Low Carbon Resilient scenario, nuclear capacity is 3 GW in 2025 and increases to 
23 GW in 2050 compared to 29 GW in the Low Carbon scenario. There is 10 GW coal 
plant in 2025 in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario compared to 3GW in the Low Carbon 
scenario. 7 GW of coal plant continues to operate in 2050 whereas there is no coal plant 
in the Low Carbon scenario at that time. In 2025, coal CCS capacity is 8 GW in the Low 
Carbon Resilient scenario compared to 12 GW in the Low Carbon scenario. By 2050, the 
capacities of coal CCS and gas plants in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario fall to 16 GW 
and 9 GW respectively compared to 31 GW and 26 GW in the Low Carbon scenario. In 
2025, investment in wind capacity is 2 GW lower than in the Low Carbon scenario. In 
2050 wind capacity in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario is 31 GW compares to 18 GW in 
the Low Carbon scenario. Interconnector capacity in 2050 increases to 10 GW. 
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Figure B-10: Electricity demand in core scenarios by sectors  
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Figure B-11: Electricity generation mix in core scenarios  
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Figure B-12: Installed capacity in core scenarios  
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B.4 CO2 emissions  
 
Due to large reductions in final energy demand, CO2 emissions also reduce across all end 
use sectors (Figure B-13). In the Resilient scenario, CO2 emissions in 2025 are 422mt 
compared to 523mt in the Reference scenario, or 18% below the 2005 level. About 35% 
of this CO2 reduction is achieved in the residential sector (by demand reduction) while a 
20% is from the power sector (switching from coal to gas).  
 
In the Resilient scenario, CO2 emissions in 2050 are 285mt compared to 583mt in the 
Reference scenario. All end use sectors and the power sector contribute to this emissions 
reduction. However, the contribution from the residential sector is substantial, more than 
65%.  The Resilient energy system reduces CO2 emission by 48% below the 1990 level, 
insufficient to reach the UK’s 80% carbon reduction target.  
 
In 2025, CO2 emissions from all end use sectors in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario fall 
by between 7-25% from the levels in the Low Carbon scenario due to demand reduction 
and fuel switching. This enables the power sector to switch to coal based generation 
from nuclear and gas in the Low Carbon scenario. Therefore CO2 emissions from the 
power sector increase by 65% in 2025. In 2050, CO2 emissions are higher in the 
transport (60%) and residential (300%) sectors in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario 
while the power sector decarbonises to a greater extent than in the Low Carbon 
scenario. For example, the CO2 intensity of electricity generation in the Low Carbon 
Resilient is 18 g/kWh versus 21 g/kWh in the Low Carbon scenario (Figure B-14). 
 
Higher CO2 emissions from the residential sector are because a complete shift to heat 
pumps has been prevented. Also, the transport sector deploys petrol/diesel hybrid cars, 
rather than plug-in hybrids and ethanol ICE in the Low Carbon scenario, and therefore 
emissions are higher. 
 
B.5 Marginal cost of CO2 abatement 
 
Figure B-15 shows the marginal cost of CO2 abatement in 2025 and 2050. In 2025, the 
marginal cost of CO2 abatement is £5/t in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario, half of that 
in the Low Carbon scenario. Since the resilient energy constraints themselves reduce 
CO2 emissions, the marginal cost of CO2 abatement declines. However, in 2050 the 
marginal abatement cost of £322/t is double that in the Low Carbon scenario. This high 
marginal cost is because the residential sector hardly decarbonises at all and the power 
sector must decarbonise through the deployment of more expensive renewables. 
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Figure B-13: CO2 emission in core scenarios by sector 
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Figure B-14: CO2 intensity of electricity generation in core scenarios 
 
 
Figure B-15: Marginal cost of CO2 abatement  
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B.6 Demand response (demand reduction) and welfare costs 
 
It is clear that the resilient energy systems are much smaller than those in the Reference 
scenario and therefore incur a lower energy system cost (Figure B-16). Undiscounted 
energy system costs in 2025 are about £2.5 billion lower than in the Reference case 
compared to a £2.3bn increase in the Low Carbon scenario. However, price-induced 
demand reduction in the end use sectors results in a loss of consumer surplus. The 
combination of changes in producer and consumer surpluses are taken to be a valid 
metric for welfare cost. In the Resilient scenario, the welfare costs are about £19bn in 
2025 and increase to £48bn in 2050. Figure B-16 shows these changes in the core 
scenarios with respect to the Reference scenario. 
 
The Low Carbon Resilient scenario requires a substantial demand response to meet the 
low carbon as well as the resilience constraints, particularly for final energy demand. By 
2050, demand reductions in the resilience scenarios are far higher than in the Low 
Carbon scenario. The welfare cost in 2025 at £19bn is similar to that in the Resilient 
scenario, but far higher than in the Low Carbon scenario. The welfare cost in 2050 
increases to £60bn (£37bn in Low Carbon).  
 
Table B-1 compares the range of price-induced demand reduction levels in the core 
scenarios with respect to the Reference scenario. Because of the final energy demand 
constraint, the reduction in demand for energy services is far higher in the resilient 
scenarios than it is in the Low Carbon scenario in all end use sectors.  For example, 
residential demand in 2025 is less than 5% lower in the Low Carbon scenario whereas it 
is up to 27% lower in the resilient scenario. The lower demand response from the 
transport sector is because of availability of a wide range of alternative vehicle 
technologies.   
 
 
Table B-1: Demand reduction in core scenarios with respect to reference 
scenario  
End-use 
sectors 
R LC LCR R LC LCR 
2025 2050 
Industry 10% - 30% 2% - 7% 10% - 30% 22% - 50% 10% - 32% 21% - 50% 
Residential 13% - 27% 2% - 5% 15% - 27% 35% - 50% 10% - 30% 30% - 50% 
Services 2% - 20% 2% - 3% 5% - 18% 13% - 36% +3% - 18% 8% - 35% 
Transport 2% - 13% 0% - 2% 2% - 13% 5% - 28% 0% - 10% 5% - 30% 
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Figure B-16: Welfare costs in core scenarios 
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B.7 Uncertainties in welfare costs 
 
The high level of welfare costs imputed in the Resilient and Low Carbon Resilient 
scenarios need to be treated with caution. This is because of some of the detailed 
modelling assumptions. 
 
One of the inputs to the MARKAL model is energy service demand (ESD). ESD for the 
residential sector has been estimated from the UK Domestic Carbon Model (UKDCM). The 
UKDCM has its own methodology/assumption on the uptake of residential conservation 
measures based on historical uptake, behavioural change, and affordability.  
 
The uptake of residential conservation measures has been kept constant across the core 
scenarios by “turning off” MARKAL-MED’s endogenous selection of conservation 
measures, as they are assumed to have been covered in the UKDCM runs. This means 
that reductions in demand, which is elastic to price,  are induced by prices only. This 
implies a fall in consumer surplus particularly if demand is relatively inelastic.  
 
In practice however, additional high cost conservation measures could be cost effective 
under a resilient energy system. Therefore additional sensitivity analyses have been 
carried out by allowing high cost conservation measures to be taken up endogenously in 
the residential and service sectors.  This sensitivity analysis is aimed at investigating the 
impact on welfare costs. The results show that the welfare loss in the Resilient scenario 
compared to the Reference scenario in 2025 falls to £16bn (compared to £19bn without 
endogenous conservation measures and in 2050 falls to £36bn compared to £48bn. In 
fact, the additional conservation measures do not increase the consumer surplus in the 
residential and service sector. Instead demand adjusts in other end use sectors. Energy 
savings are effectively passed on to substitute for more expensive measures in other 
sectors. For example, industrial demand reduction falls to 18-47%, compared to 23-50% 
in the Resilient scenario without endogenous conservation. The additional conservation 
measure reduce the welfare loss in the Low Carbon Resilient scenario from £60 billion to 
£ 50 billion in 2050. However, there is no significant change in energy pathways. 
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ANNEX C: DETAILED GAS ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Table C-1 shows the assumed cost of natural gas in the core scenarios in 16 separate 
tranches. A limited volume of gas is available in each tranche before the MARKAL and 
CGEN models move on to the next most expensive tranche.  
 
Table C-1: Assumed Cost of Natural Gas (2000 £/GJ) 
 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Norway 2.934 2.934 2.655 2.655 2.753 2.878 3.003 
Russia 3.117 3.117 2.821 2.821 2.925 3.058 3.191 
Russia 3.301 3.301 2.987 2.987 3.097 3.238 3.379 
Russia 3.484 3.484 3.153 3.153 3.269 3.418 3.567 
LNG 2.567 2.567 2.323 2.323 2.409 2.519 2.628 
LNG 3.668 3.668 3.319 3.319 3.441 3.598 3.754 
LNG 4.034 4.034 3.65 3.65 3.786 3.958 4.13 
Domestic gas 1 1.853 1.853 1.853 1.853 1.853 1.853 1.853 
Domestic gas 2 2.327 2.327 2.327 2.327 2.327 2.327 2.327 
Domestic gas 3 2.516 2.516 2.516 2.516 2.516 2.516 2.516 
Domestic gas 4 3.275 3.275 3.275 3.275 3.275 3.275 3.275 
Domestic gas 5 3.465 3.465 3.465 3.465 3.465 3.465 3.465 
Domestic gas 6 3.844 3.844 3.844 3.844 3.844 3.844 3.844 
Domestic gas 7 4.318 4.318 4.318 4.318 4.318 4.318 4.318 
Domestic gas 8 4.792 4.792 4.792 4.792 4.792 4.792 4.792 
Domestic gas 9 5.266 5.266 5.266 5.266 5.266 5.266 5.266 
 
Domestic gas supply is limited by UKCS recoverable gas reserves shown in Table C-2. 
 
Table C-2: UKCS gas reserves in 2008 (bcm) 
Domestic gas region Proven Probable Possible Potential 
Additional 
Resources 
Northern & Shetlands 104 62 85 43 
Central 186 98 90 28 
Southern 128 70 86 47 
Irish 62 18 18 7 
Domestic gas cost tranches1 1,2 3,4,5 6,7,8 9 
Note: 1) volume is split evenly between tranches 
 
Import supply availability is shown in Table C-3. All imports are subject to further 
constraints on the capacity of pipelines connected to the UK national gas transmission 
system. 
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Table C-3: Annual Import Availability (bcm) 
 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Norway 27 33 40 40 40 40 
Russia 160 240 270 270 270 270 
LNG 27 107 134 156 186 210 
Note: LNG and Russian gas supplies are split evenly between tranches  
 
Table C-4 shows the entry costs of gas at six terminals receiving pipeline gas. 
 
Table C-4: Assumed Entry Costs for Pipeline Gas  
Terminal Cost (2000 £/GJ) 
St Fergus 0.061 
Bacton 0.017 
Teesside 0.006 
Easington 0.005 
Theddlethorpe 0.006 
Barrow 0.000 
  
 
